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Abstract 
This research looks at how human trust in an information system is influenced by 
external safeguards in an Information Warfare (IW) domain. The military command and 
control environment requires decision-makers to make tactical judgments based on 
complex and conflicting information received from various sources such as automated 
information systems. Information systems are relied upon in command and control 
environments to provide fast and reliable information to the decision-makers. The degree 
of reliance placed in these systems by the decision-makers suggests a significant level of 
trust. Understanding this trust relationship and what effects it is the focus of this study. 
A model is proposed that predicts behavior associated with human trust in information 
systems. It is hypothesized that a decision-maker's belief in the effectiveness of external 
safeguards will positively influence a decision-maker's trusting behavior. Likewise, the 
presence of an Information Warfare attack will have a negative affect a decision-maker's 
trusting behavior. Two experiments were conducted in which the perceived effectiveness 
of external safeguards and the information provided by an information system were 
manipulated in order to test the hypotheses presented in this study. The findings from 
both experiments suggest that a person's trust computers in specific situations are useful 
in predicting trusting behavior, external safeguards have a negative effect on trusting 
behavior, and that Information Warfare attacks have no effect on trusting behavior. 
XI 
THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL SAFEGUARDS ON HUMAN-INFORMATION 
SYSTEM TRUST IN AN INFORMATION WARFARE ENVIRONMENT 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Historians will likely reflect on the Twentieth Century as an era of unprecedented 
advancements in science and technology. Of these advancements, perhaps none has 
transfigured our society as profoundly as the "information technology revolution" (Halal, 
1992). Information technology has transformed society socially, economically, and 
politically (Sheridan, 2000). An example of this transformation is the conversion of the 
United States economy from a post-World War II industrial based economy to the current 
information services based economy (Gray, 1999). By the last half of the Twentieth 
Century, information technologies have become the primary means by which information 
is processed and exchanged (Halal, 1992, McConnell, 1996). 
Not only are information technologies used as a means of processing and 
exchanging information, but also they are increasingly used and relied upon to control 
and operate critical functions in society. This growing trend has generated sufficient 
interest by researchers to examine the behavior of people who rely on these information 
systems (Biros, 1998; Muir, 1996; Morray and Lee 1992; Mosier, Stitka, and Burdick, 
2000, Sheridan and Hennessy, 1984, Bisantz, Llina, Seong, Finger, and Jian 2000). A 
recent issue of a leading information technology journal, Communications of the ACM, 
devoted the entire issue to trust in information systems (Friedman, Kahn, and Howe, 
2000; Olson and Olson, 2000; Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and Kuwabara, 2000; 
Cassell and Bickmore, 2000; Shneiderman, 2000; Uslaner, 2000). 
Most of the current research efforts have attempted to apply human-human 
relationship models, such as trust, to the human-information system relationship (Biros, 
1998; Muir, 1996; Morray and Lee 1992). While these researchers have found some 
evidence to support the idea that humans trust information systems in the same way 
humans trust other humans, there are enough significant differences to continue this line 
of research. 
Unfortunately, this stream of research is somewhat disjoint. So many different 
definitions and facets of trust have been used in this area of study that it becomes difficult 
to adequately compare the findings from existing research. In fact, one of the leading 
trust theorists described this situation as a "conceptual morass" (Barber, 1983: 1). While 
there is no one generally accepted definition of trust, there are some commonalties among 
these definitions. For example, trust is often defined in terms of a behavior of reliance 
(McKnight and Chervany, 1999). This is consistent with Webster's Third new 
International Dictionary which defines trust as an "assumed reliance on some person or 
thing; a confident dependence on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or 
something" (Gove, 1981). 
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) suggest that, as a person becomes reliant 
(through the act of bestowing trust) on another person, the trustor becomes vulnerable to 
the trustee. Carrying this concept to the human-information system trust relationship, it 
suggests that people become vulnerable to potentially negative consequences because of 
their trust in these systems (Bonoma, 1975, Giffin, 1967). This vulnerability becomes 
even greater as society continues to rely on computer technology, not only for simple 
automation, but also as critical and complex information systems (DeSanctis and Poole, 
1994). 
Research Applicability to the United States Air Force 
The United States Air Force, like the other branches of the military, has become 
increasingly reliant upon complex information systems. A 1996 article in the 
Washington Post illustrates the degree of this reliance: 
the American military is the most information-dependent force in 
the world. It uses computers to help design weapons, guide 
missiles, pay soldiers, manage medical supplies, write memos, 
control radio networks, train tank crews, mobilize reservists, issue 
press releases, find spare parts and even suggest tactics to combat 
commanders (Washington Post, 16 July 1996). 
Consequently, the Air Force has allowed itself to become vulnerable due to its 
heavy reliance on information systems. In response to this perceived vulnerability, the 
Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff called for a change to Air Force 
operational strategy and tactics in order to ensure the Air Force gains and maintains 
information superiority (Cornerstones of Information Warfare, 1996). 
Part of establishing information superiority involves maintaining an effective 
defense against adversarial attacks that are directed against critical information systems 
(Cornerstones of Information Warfare, 1996). A great deal of work to mitigate the risk of 
this type of attack has focused on the development of effective physical barriers and 
increased security awareness training for its personnel (Mayer, 2000). Despite these 
efforts, unauthorized intrusions into Air Force information systems continue to occur as 
illustrated by a recent network security test conducted by the Air Force Information 
Warfare Center (IWC). The IWC noted that of the networks tested "46 percent were 
successfully accessed, and IWC operators were able to obtain total control of 28 percent 
of the systems" (as quoted in Biros, 1998). Examples and theories of the type of damage 
caused by network attacks is abundant in both news reports and research studies (Van 
Cleave, 1997; Roman, 1999; Mayer, 2000; Whitehead, 1999). Unfortunately, little is 
known about the behavioral effect these attacks have on the decision-maker who is reliant 
upon these systems. 
Problem Statement and Purpose of Research 
Understanding the factors that influence a person's trust in information systems in 
an adversarial environment is important, not only for the United States Air Force, but for 
any organization that relies upon information systems. This study examines some of the 
variables that may influence a person's trust in information systems and proposes a 
theoretical framework to study the effects of these variables on human behavior in a 
military command and control environment.. 
Summary 
The explosive reliance on information systems has brought both benefits in terms 
of increased communication and productivity, and liabilities in terms of increased 
vulnerabilities to deception. Despite the potential consequences of these vulnerabilities, 
information technologies continue to be relied upon to perform increasingly critical 
functions in society. Given the United States Air Force's reliance on information systems 
as strategic and tactical decision-making tools, it is crucial to understand the effects of 
trust in an adversarial environment. 
Thesis Organization 
The following chapters present support for a conceptual framework that will be 
used to observe some variables that may influence a person's trusting behavior. Chapter 
II provides a literature review of the body of work in decision-making, information 
warfare, and trust. A series of hypotheses is also offered that will be tested in two 
empirical experiments. Chapter III explains the experimental and methodological 
framework for the first experiment used to test the hypotheses. Chapter IV presents the 
statistical analysis of the data collected from the first experiment. Chapter V explains the 
experimental and methodological framework for the second experiment and Chapter VI 
presents the statistical analysis of the data collected from this experiment. Finally, 
Chapter VII synthesizes and compares the analysis of both experiments and presents the 
research findings and conclusions. 
II.     LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Marshall McLuhan is often remembered for his prediction that all societies will 
one day blend together into a "global village" as a result of advances in information 
technology (McLuhan 1989). In many ways, McLuhan's predictions have become a 
reality. Information technology has transformed societies socially, economically, and 
politically (Sheridan, 2000). Over the past two decades, the extent of this transformation 
has been profound, both in terms of the extent to which information is shared and in 
terms of the extent to which information technology is relied upon to perform critical 
tasks. 
The term "information technology" is often vaguely defined. DeSanctis and 
Poole define advanced information technologies (AIT) as those "technologies that enable 
multi-party participation in organizational activities through sophisticated information 
management" (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994: 121). These technologies include electronic 
mail, electronic data transfer systems, and decision support systems (Biros, 1998). 
Information systems are defined in this study as any AIT artifact that provides 
information to decision-makers. 
Understanding why some societies have become so dependent upon information 
systems is the topic of debate among modern philosophers (Kellner, 1997; Borgmann, 
1992; Wickens, 1999). Some argue the use and reliance upon information systems is 
simply a natural progression of a capitalistic society (Kellner, 1997). This school of 
thought argues that monetary gain is the underlying driver of information systems. 
Others believe that information systems are an enabler by which society reorganizes itself 
(Borgmann, 1992). For instance, the emergence and use of electronic mail and chat 
rooms extend social networks to an extent not otherwise possible before the advent of 
information systems (Kellner, 1997). Still others argue the reliance on information 
systems is a solution to the inherent complexities of modern life (Parasuraman, 1987; 
Wickens, 1999). Examples of these complexities include control of nuclear power plants, 
air traffic control systems, and military operations. These complex systems require 
information systems to help people synthesize and analyze huge amounts of information 
in order to efficiently and effectively manage them. While pondering the cause for the 
explosive use of information systems in society is of interest to philosophers, exploring 
the behavioral effects associated with the use of these systems is also of interest to 
researchers. 
This chapter explores the human-information system trust relationship and 
examines how attitudes and events may effect this relationship. It begins by reviewing 
pertinent literature related to this research and then presents a theoretical framework 
within which this issue will be explored. Theories reviewed include decision-making 
(Simons, 1957; Orasanu and Connolly, 1993), information warfare (McCornack, Levine, 
Morrison, and Lapinski, 1996; Whitehead, 1997; Biros, 1998), and trust (Zuboff, 1988; 
Muir, 1994; Mosier, Skitka and Burdick, 2000, McKnight and Chervany, 1999).   Finally, 
hypotheses will be presented that relate to the influence information warfare and external 
safeguards have on the behavior of people who rely on information systems to aid in 
decision-making. 
Decision Making Theories 
In order to understand how humans trust information systems in a command and 
control environment, it is important to first understand how those information systems are 
used by the military commander. In modern military command and control centers, 
military commanders use a wide variety of information systems to synthesize and display 
information about the battle space (Klein, 1988; Roman, 1999). This information is 
primarily used by the military commander to make decisions. Therefore, a review of 
literature on decision-making was performed in order to understand how decisions are 
made and what types of things could effect the decision-maker. 
Decision-making theories are rich and span across various academic disciplines 
(Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1958; Hall, 1996; Zey, 1992). For instance, theories 
and models of decision-making were found in organizational behavior, management, 
strategy, and cognitive psychology. Despite this, a review of decision making research 
found that these theories and models fall into one of two main schools of thought: 
Rational Choice and Naturalistic Decision Making. 
Rational Choice 
Most modern theories dealing with decision-making begin with a theoretical 
model called the Rational Choice model. (Simon, 1957; Hall, 1996). The Rational 
Choice model is divided into three areas: certainty, risk, and uncertainty. 
The certainty area is sometimes referred to as the economic man model. The 
economic man ".. .is characterized by the following: acting only in his self-interest, 
possessing full information about the decision problem, knowing all the possible 
solutions from which he has to choose as well as the consequences of each solution, 
seeking to maximize utility, having the ability to rank alternatives in order of likelihood 
of maximizing outcomes" (Zey, 1992: 11). However, March and Simon (1958) 
acknowledge some difficulties with this area of classical decision-making theory. They 
point out that classical decision-making theories based on certainty make assumptions 
that, often, do not exist in reality. For instance, March and Simon (1958) recognize that 
these theories hinge upon the assumption that decision-makers know all possible 
information required to determine all possible outcomes for a decision and are able to 
develop an optimal order for these outcomes. However, in reality most decisions are 
made with uncertainty. Simon (1957) refers to this area of decision-making as "bounded 
rationality." 
Simon (1959) suggests that in situations where uncertainty exists, a behavior 
called "satisficing" may occur. Satisficing is perhaps best defined by the analogy given 
by Simon (1959) where he describes a man searching for the sharpest needle, of many, in 
a haystack. Instead of trying to find all of the needles and comparing each of them to one 
another in order to see which is the sharpest, the man stops after finding a needle that is 
sufficiently sharp. Most modem decision-making research is grounded in bounded- 
rationality. One such growing area of decision-making research is Naturalistic Decision 
Making. 
Naturalistic Decision Making 
In the mid-1980s, a decision-making paradigm was proposed to explain how 
decision-making occurs in a bounded rationality context, or more simply in uncertainty. 
This paradigm is referred to as Naturalistic Decision-Making (Orasanu and Connolly, 
1993). 
The Naturalistic Decision-Making movement began slowly, but has recently 
gained momentum and wider acceptance among serious researchers (Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, and Grossman, 1991). This growing acceptance is due largely for the need to 
understand decision making as it occurs in a naturalistic setting by the actual people who 
make the decisions. This growing need is due, in part, to the increased complexities of 
modern society. 
Naturalistic Decision Making is identified by eight factors that typify the 
naturalistic environment (See Table 1). In addition to these factors, Cannon-Bower, 
Table 1. List of NDM Factors from Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Pruitt, 1996 
Eight Factors of Naturalistic Environment 
ill-structured problems 
uncertain, dynamic environments 
shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 




organizational norms and goals that must be balanced against the 
decision makers' personal choice 
Salas, and Pruitt (1996) offer some additional factors that define decision-making in a 
naturalistic environment. One of these additional factors is "Multiple event feedback 
10 
loops" (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Pruitt, 1996). They propose that most decisions are 
"temporally dependent, ongoing series, with the outcome of iterative decisions affecting 
subsequent decisions" (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Pruitt, 1996: 199). This concept of a 
temporally dependent decision-making cycle supports a similar, however somewhat 
simpler decision-making model that was offered to explain how military commanders 
make decision in an adversarial environment. 
Observation, Orientation Decision, Action (OODA) Loop Theory 
The OODA Loop model (see Figure 4 below) proposed by Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd (1987) describes the decision-making process of military commanders in C2 
Action Observation 
Decision Orientation 
Figure 1. OODA Model taken from 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/aia/afiwc/index.html. 2000 
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environments and is consistent with the Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) paradigm. 
His model depicts four iterative stages that military commanders go through when 
making decisions. 
The first stage of the OODA Loop is the observation stage. In this stage, 
commanders use their senses to gather situational information. This information may 
come from first-hand visual observations of actual events or objects, direct or synthesized 
auditory inputs, and visual representations of actual events or objects via some media. 
The next stage is the orientation stage. It is in this stage that commanders orient, 
or make sense from, the information they observed. The Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) Model proposed by NDM researchers supports this concept (Klein, 1988). The 
RPD model "emphasizes the importance of situation assessment in expert decision 
making (Drillings and Serfaty, 1997). The orientation stage is, in effect, the military 
commander's situational assessment of the observed information influenced by his or her 
previous experience or pattern recognition. 
Following the orientation stage, the OODA Loop model proposes that military 
commanders enter the decision stage. This stage results in a choice of alternative courses 
of action. The RPD model postulates that fewer alternatives are generated by 
experienced decision-makers because they tend to stop generating decisions when the 
first satisfactory choice is determined (Drillings and Serfaty, 1997). This may explain 
why military commanders in stressful, fast-paced, ill-defined situations are able to make 
decisions faster than might be expected by the Rational Decision Making model. Boyd's 
(1987) decision stage is supported by Simon's (1959) satisficing process that occurs in a 
bounded rationality context. 
12 
The final stage, the action stage, is when the military commander initiates some 
action or behavior based on the option decided upon in the decision stage. This action 
may be some behavior, like pulling the trigger to giving an order to launch a missile. It 
may also result in no observable behavior, for instance the choice not to act. 
While the OODA Loop is not rich in empirical support, support for this cognitive 
process is found in the Rational Choice Model, NDM and other literature (Simon, 1957; 
Roman, 1999; Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen, and Wolf, 1996; Entin and Serfaty, 1997; 
Drillings and Serfaty, 1997; Seong, Llina, Drury, and Bisantz, 2000). Therefore, the 
OODA Loop model provides a useful starting point from which to examine decision- 
making and how it relates to the human-information system trust relationship in a 
command and control environment. 
Command and Control 
The widespread integration of information systems into the modern military 
command and control (C2) environment provides a unique environment within which 
people make decisions based, in part, on information received from information systems. 
Therefore, a review of C2 related literature was performed in order to identify some of 
the unique elements of military C2 environments that may influence the human- 
information system trust relationship. 
As Roman (1999) and others point out, finding an agreed upon definition of 
command and control is difficult given the varied and conflicting definitions in the 
literature (Drillings and Serfaty, 1997). C2 is defined in this study in the same way that 
Drillings and Serfaty eloquently put it; "Command and control (C2) is the term that 
13 
describes the job of the battle commander. C2 is characterized by ill-structured 
problems, changing conditions, high stakes, and time demands" (Drillings and Serfaty, 
1997: 71). Given these uncertainties, risks, and time demands, battle commanders have 
become reliant upon information systems as tools to help reduce the uncertainty, risk, and 
time demands. The usefulness and value of these tools is determined by many factors 
including among them trust in both the information system and the source of the 
information (Davis, 1986; Dillon and Morris, 1996). 
One recent study proposed a framework from which to study human trust in 
automated decision-making aids in a C2 environment (Bisantz, Llina, Seong, Finger, and 
Jian, 2000). Bisantz et a/'s study suggest that one of the most significant factors that 
influence decision-making in a C2 environment is the threat of an attack by an adversary 
against the C2 information systems. This military-unique threat is commonly referred to 
as Information Warfare. 
Information Warfare 
Information has long been considered a vital element in warfare. Over 2500 years 
ago, military strategists like Sun Tzu (6th cent B.C.) wrote about the importance of 
gathering information, both about oneself and the enemy, before going into battle. In 
addition, his teachings suggest that the wise commander attempts to wage war using the 
least possible effort. Traditionally, information gathering and battles required the 
movement of military troops close to an enemy's geographical location. This was costly 
for the attacker both in terms of time and effort. Additionally, the geographical distance 
and barriers the attacking force had to traverse afforded the enemy some means of 
14 
protection. However, the protection once afforded to economic, social, and military 
infrastructures by geographical distances, are now increasingly vulnerable because of the 
connectivity offered by the Internet and due to the reliance upon information systems that 
control these infrastructures (Van Cleave, 1997). An enemy can now easily, quickly, and 
covertly attack critical information systems using a wide variety of techniques. 
Therefore, understanding which of these techniques may effect a military commander's 
trust in the C2 information systems they rely upon is of great importance to this research. 
This study defines information warfare as both the offensive and defensive use of 
information as a weapon through the exploitation of information technologies. Arguably, 
there are a multitude of perspectives and definitions of information warfare (Van Cleave, 
1997; Kuehl, 2000; Cornerstones of Information Warfare, 1996; Whitehead, 1999). 
While there may not be agreement on a common definition, there are commonalties 
among the information warfare tactics and weapons suggested in these writings, such as 
software viruses, denial of service attacks, and information manipulation. 
The versatile and ubiquitous nature of the Internet has spawned the creation of a 
variety of information warfare weapons and tactics (Van Cleave, 1997). Direct launch is 
a tactic that describes the indiscriminate employment of software viruses and logic 
bombs. These software viruses and logic bombs cause software application, operating 
systems, and sometimes hardware damage to any system that becomes infected. Forward 
basing is similar to "direct launch", except that these software viruses lie dormant until a 
specific action triggers its activation. Hacking is another tactic where unauthorized 
persons gain access to information systems. Hackers gain access for a variety of motives 
including curiosity, theft of information, or the intentional manipulation of information. 
15 
Information Manipulation Theory 
The intentional manipulation of information poses, perhaps, the greatest threat to 
modern military command and control centers (Kuel, 2000; Everett, DeWindt, and 
McDade, 2000). The potential damage that can be caused to an adversary by creating 
false information in their command and control systems is potentially enormous. A 
recent Air Force News article painted a vivid picture of this type of attack: 
Imagine if you told an F-16 Fighting Falcon pilot to attack a target 
550 miles away, and then learned the plane's maximum range was 
only 500 miles. Or suppose you ordered a C-5 to deliver cargo to 
an airport where the runway was too short for the plane to land. 
(Mayer, 21 Jun 2000) 
This example illustrates the chaos made possible by the intentional manipulation 
of information in a C2 system. The model of intentionally manipulating data is not new 
or unique to the information age. A recent Information Manipulation theory was 
proposed to describe deception in communication (McCornack, Levine, Morrison, and 
Lapinski, 1996).   This theory suggests that violation of one or more of the maxims 
(quantity, quality, relation, and manner) results in a deceptive communication. While not 
rich, some support for this theory is found in the literature (Yeung, Levine, and 
Nishiyama; 1999, Biros, 1998). For instance, the intentional manipulation of the number 
of enemy troops in a C2 information system violates the maxim of quality and, therefore 
would be classified as information manipulation. The information manipulation theory 
also suggests that the intentional manipulation of information may influence a decision 
maker to make a decision that is different from what they would have made given the 
original information. Since this theory suggests that information manipulation can 
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influence a decision-maker, and because decision-making in a C2 environment using 
information systems suggests trust between the military commander and C2 information 
systems, it is important to understand what trust is and what other factors may influence 
trusting behavior. 
Theories of Trust 
A common thread throughout each of the previous sections is trust. Therefore, 
before a framework can be developed to study the overall research question, a thorough 
review of trust research is necessary. 
Theories and philosophies on trust can be found throughout history. The ancient 
Greek philosopher, Aristotle, began his great work, Metaphysics, by asserting that man 
should trust the sense of sight above all others (Kirwan, 1993). Aristotle does not clearly 
define trust, however the definition suggests a belief in something. Vague definitions of 
trust, like Aristotle's are not the exception. Throughout recorded history, the term "trust" 
has been either vaguely or narrowly. This causes difficulties for scholars who wish to 
study and compare trust research (Golembiewski and McConkie, 1975). In the last 
century, trust has been defined across the spectrum of academic disciplines. In one study, 
a review of trust literature found divergent definitions of trust across the disciplines of 
management, communications, sociology, economics, political science, psychology, and 
social psychology (McKnight and Chervany, 1999). As McKnight and Chervany (1999) 
point out, trust is too broad a concept to define narrowly. Therefore, a literature review 
of trust research is presented below. The purpose of the review was to find a suitable 
model of trust broad enough in scope to allow cross-disciplinary studies and robust 
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enough to examine the trust relationship between people and information systems, 
especially in C2 environment. 
Human Trust in Information Systems 
The vast majority of trust research found deals primarily with trust between and 
among humans. However, with the advent of the computer age and with the increasing 
role information systems play in society, there are a growing number of studies on the 
trust relationship between humans and information systems. Examples of how important 
and integral information systems have become in American society are plentiful. 
Information systems are used for everything from exchanging information between 
businesses, assisting pilots to operate aircraft, controlling nuclear power plants, and 
directing military forces in battle. The critical nature of these tasks underscores the need 
to understand the human-information system trust relationship. 
One such study (Zuboff, 1988) looked at how people trust automation in the 
workplace. This research found that workers tended to either distrust the technology 
resulting in the lessened use of the automation or over trust in the automation resulting in 
problems when the automation subsequently failed (Zuboff, 1988). Zuboff s 
observations have been widely supported in empirical studies (Muir, 1987; Muir and 
Moray, 1996; Mosier, Skitka, and Burdick, 2000; Seong, Llina, Drury, and Bisantz, 
2000). 
Some of the most cited of these empirical studies are Muir's trust in automation 
experiments (Muir, 1987; Muir, 1994; Muir and Moray, 1996). Muir's experiments 
consisted of having subjects perform a task on system simulators that had both manual 
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and automated controls. The subjects either experienced random errors with the 
automated control, consistent errors, or no errors. Muir measured the subjects trust in the 
system throughout the duration of the experiment. 
Muir's findings were consistent with that of Zuboff and others (Sheridan and 
Hennessy, 1984; Wiener and Curry, 1980). She found that workers monitoring 
automation became complacent when the automation was perceived to perform correctly. 
Similarly, she found workers spent more time monitoring systems considered to be error 
prone (Muir, 1994). In addition to these findings, Muir found evidence to suggest that 
following a perceived error, a person's trust will degrade but will gradually recover over 
time. Her findings have been supported in similar studies (Lee and Moray, 1992; 
Bisantz, Llina, Seong, Finger, and Jian, 2000). 
To measure trust in automation, Muir incorporated Barber's (1983) taxonomy of 
trust and Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna's (1985) taxonomy of the development of trust as a 
basis for a model specifically tailored towards human trust in automation. Her model of 
trust consists of three dimensions of expectations: Persistence, Technical Competence, 
and Fiduciary Responsibility. Each of these dimensions are crossed with three levels of 
experience: Predictability, Dependability, and Faith (see Figure 2 next page). 
Persistence is defined as "an expectation of constancy" (Muir, 1994, 1910). This 
suggests a fundamental assumption or expectation by people that physical and social laws 
exist and are predictable and stable in nature. For instance, man is good, gravity will 
continue to make things fall, and electrons will continue to spin about the nucleus of 

























































Figure 2. Man-Machine Model of Trust taken from Muir (1994) 
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tailored towards automation than is Barber's (1983) definition of competence. Here, 
Muir defines technical competence as it pertains to some automated system. This 
technical competence consists of "expert knowledge, technical facility, or routine 
performance" (Muir, 1994: 1910-1911). This concept suggests humans come to expect 
machines to perform a given or programmed task correctly. The final dimension in 
Muir's model is that of fiduciary responsibility. This is defined in situations where "a 
trustor's own technical competence is exceeded by the referent's, or when the 
competence of another is completely unknown" (Muir, 1994: 1911). In terms of a 
person's trust in an information system, an example of this would be a person's trust in 
the benevolence or intentions of the system designer (Barber, 1983; Muir, 1994). 
Muir and others believe that trust is "a hierarchical stage model, where trust 
develops over time, first depending upon predictability, then dependability, and finally 
faith" (Lee and Moray, 1992: 1245). This model of trust is consistent with the cyclical 
nature of decision-making as offered in the OODA Loop model (Boyd, 1987). However, 
other trust research suggests some facets of trust not encorporated in this model. 
Therefore, the search for a model that encompasses these additional facets, especially 
those useful to examine trust in a military environment was continued. 
Automation Bias 
Muir measured the constructs of fiduciary responsibility, technical competence, 
and trust behavior using survey instruments and observed behavior. Human factors 
researchers often use observed behavior as a measure of trust, especially in the widely 
studied population of aircrews. (Mosier, Skitka, and Heers, 2000; Mosier, Skitka, and 
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Burdick, 2000). In these studies, subjects participated in controlled experiments using 
the aid of an auto pilot system to control a simulated aircraft. The goal of their research 
was to study the suggestion that air crews ".. .have a tendency to over-rely on automation 
to perform tasks and make decisions for them rather than using the aids as one 
component of thorough monitoring and decision-making processes" (Mosier, Skitka, and 
Heers, 2000: n. pag.). This phenomenon, which they call "automation bias" is consistent 
with Zuboff s (1988) study. This study found a significant number of experienced airline 
pilots caused both automation omission errors (i.e. failing to take appropriate action 
because the auto pilot system did not provide information) and automation commission 
errors (i.e. committing an error based on erroneous information presented by the auto 
pilot system). This study, and others found significant evidence that this cognitive bias 
(i.e. automation bias) exists and may be due to excessive reliance on these trusted 
systems (Mosier, Skitka, and Heers, 2000; Mosier, Skitka, and Burdick, 2000). 
Truth Bias 
The phenomenon of automation bias is consistent and similar to another theory 
called "truth bias" offered by McCornack et al (1996). Truth bias suggests that as people 
develop trusted relationships with others, they tend to believe what is told to them by the 
trusted person without verifying the information. The truth bias theory was later 
extended to include a person's trust in information system artifacts (Biros, 1998). Biros 
examined the effects of intentional manipulation of information within the framework of 
his proposed "artifact truth bias" model. Automation bias, truth bias, and artifact truth 
bias are all consistent with the findings of Zuboff (1988) and offer support to the notion 
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that people trust information systems in the same way they trust other people. 
Furthermore, automation bias and truth bias suggests that decision-makers who rely on 
and trust information systems may be susceptible to information warfare tactics like 
information manipulation. 
Applicability to Trust in Information Systems 
The studies of trust in automation presented above offer strong evidence that a 
person's trust or trusting behavior in information systems is possible to model, measure, 
and predict. However, the models of trust used in these studies are somewhat limited in 
scope. Muir's model of trust, for instance, fails to measure the full dimensions of trust. 
While her model (see Figure 3) accounts for a mental model of others (i.e. a disposition 
to trust), it fails to further break down, define, and measure the various types of this 
dispositional trust. For example, a person's disposition to trust may be situational in 
nature or a general assumption based on previous beliefs (McKnight and Chervany, 1999; 
Riker, 1971; Kee and Knox, 1970). Likewise, while the studies of automation and truth 
bias observed behavior as a means to measure trust, they failed to adequately define and 
measure specific factors of trust. Examples of these specific factors include the 
situational nature of trust and a more general disposition to trust. Additionally, none of 
these studies defined or measured the influence that trust in external safeguards, either 
organizational or technical, have on a person's trusting behavior. Despite this, the 
framework used in these studies are useful in developing a new framework within which 
the trust relationship between people and information systems can be more fully 
examined. 
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Theory of Reasoned Action 
Most of the trust research described in the previous sections have looked at trust 
as a behavior (Muir, 1994; Muir and Moray, 1996; McCornack et al, 1996; Mosier, 
Skitka, and Heers, 2000; Mosier, Skitka, and Burdick, 2000). Therefore, a search for a 
model that predicts trust as a behavior was performed. This search found that most such 
models designed to predict behavior are grounded in Fishbein and Ajzen's Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) (1975). The TRA model has been widely cited and used as the 
basis for several predictive behavioral models. For instance, Davis' Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) (1986) has been used successfully to predict the attitudes and 
behavior of people towards technology. This provides evidence that the TRA model may 
be useful in predicting trusting behavior towards technology. 
The TRA (see Figure 3 next page) suggests a person's behavior can be predicted 
by first understanding the person's intention to carry out the behavior, which in turn is 
determined by both the person's attitude and subjective norm (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975). Each of these two constructs, attitude and subjective norms, are influenced by 
some preexisting belief structure. 
In the case of attitude, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) suggest that a person's attitude 
can be influenced through a change in the person's belief about the consequences of their 
actions. Their belief in the consequences of their actions can be influenced by some 
external stimulus (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, Dillon and Morris, 1996). Likewise, the 
person's normative beliefs and motivation to act can influence the construct of subjective 
norms. This belief and motivation is also influenced by some external stimulus (Fishbein 
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Figure 3. Theory of Reasoned Action model taken from Dillon and Morris (1996) 
McKnight and Chervany's Model of Trust 
McKnight and Chervany's (1999) theoretical model of trust is based on TRA and 
is broad enough in scope and robust enough to use in this research. This model's breadth 
of scope is rooted in Tiryakian's (1968) attempt to organize and fully categorize the 
various definitions of trust. Tiryakian's categorization effort was extended by McKnight 
and Chervany (1999) who created two conceptual typologies of trust: "typology type 
(a)—a classification system for types of kinds of trust; typology type (b)—a set of six 
related types of trust constructs resulting from the analysis of the classification system 
(Tiryakian, 1968)" (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 3). From these classifications and 
typologies, McKnight and Chervany developed a model of trust that incorporates the 
broad scope of these various components (see Figure 4 below). 
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Figure 4. McKnight's Model of Trust drawn from 
(McKnight and Chervaney, 1999) 
Trusting behavior is treated in this model as a latent construct capable of being 
measured by indicators (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, Riker, 1971). For instance, 
taking a prescribed medication based on the recommendation of a doctor is not, in itself 
trust, but rather an indicator of trust. These indicators take many forms, but in essence 
each indicator can be defined as ".. .any act of dependence or increasing dependence" on 
another person or object (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 26). The concept of reliance 
and dependence are often found in trust literature (Barber, 1983; Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman, 1995; Muir, 1994; Sheridan and Hennessy, 1984). One type of trust 
indicator is the act of making a decision based on the actions of another despite a possible 
loss or negative consequence (Anderson and Narus, 1990). 
The trusting behavior construct is supported by a person's intention to trust. 
McKnight and Chervany define trusting intention as "the extent to which one party is 
willing to depend on the other party in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, 
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even though negative consequences are possible" (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 23). 
The five essential components of this construct include a possible negative consequence, 
a dependence on the person or object, a relative feeling of security, a lack of or 
willingness to relinquish control, and all within a given situational context. (Bonoma, 
1976; Giffin, 1967; Dobing, 1993; Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna, 1985; Gabarro, 1978; 
Lawler and Rhode, 1976; Anthony, 1965). This construct is difficult to observe and is 
often measured through some instrument, such as a survey or questionnaire. 
In the same way trusting intention supports trusting behavior, a person's 
"cognitive beliefs and belief-related confidence" support the trusting belief (McKnight 
and Chervany, 1999, 26). McKnight and Chervany (1999) conclude that trusting belief 
consists of four main elements: benevolence, honesty, competence, and predictability 
(Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; Dobing, 1993; Gabarro, 1978). Benevolence is the 
extent one is concerned with the welfare of another. Honesty is defined in terms of 
truthfulness and making good on an agreement. Competence is defined as having the 
ability to do what needs to be done. Finally, predictability is defined as actions that are 
consistent enough to enable a forecast of a future action in a given situation. 
As mentioned before, trust is situational in nature (Riker, 1971; Kee and Knox, 
1970), therefore the construct of situational decision to trust is defined as "the extent to 
which one intends to depend on a non-specific other party in a given situation" 
(McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 29). This construct directly supports trusting intention, 
rather than trusting belief, because it is not related to a specific person or object, but 
rather to a specific situation. 
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Unlike situational decision to trust, McKnight and Chervany (1999) propose a 
construct that is situationally independent, disposition to trust (Harnett and Cummings, 
1980; Wrightsman, 1991; Rotter, 1967). Disposition to trust is the extent to which a 
person "has a consistent tendency to trust across a broad spectrum of situations and 
persons" (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 29). They suggest there are two types of 
dispositional trust: Type A and Type B. Type A dispositional trust is a kind of general 
assumption by a person that other people or objects are trustworthy. Type B dispositional 
trust, on the other hand, does not make any such assumption. The disposition to trust is 
based on the belief that the result of the trust will be better than if they did not trust 
(McKnight and Chervany, 1999). Because Type A is specifically related to the person or 
object of trust, it supports trusting belief. However, Type B is related to the outcome, 
therefore Type B supports trusting intention (McKnight and Chervany, 1999). 
The final construct in this model of trust is system trust. System trust is defined 
as the "extent to which one believes that proper impersonal structures are in place to 
enable one to anticipate a successful future endeavor" (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 
28). In this case, a person's trust in another person or object is not based on any belief or 
attitude towards that person or object, but rather based on the attitude or belief in a 
safeguard of some external entity (Shapiro, 1987, Luhmann, 1991; Zucker, 1986). System 
trust directly supports trusting intention because it "act[s] like a safety net" and reduces 
the level of risk and uncertainty (McKnight and Chervany, 1999, 28). 
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Applicability to Human-Information System trust 
McKnight and Chervany's model of trust meets the criteria set forth in this study 
to capture the breadth and scope of the trust concept. This model encompasses the trust 
theories of leading researchers across academic disciplines, including Muir's research on 
trust in automation, and provides a means for a comparative analysis between this study 
and previous research in automation trust. While not all of the constructs in McKnight 
and Chervany's model will be studied, some of their constructs lend themselves nicely to 
examining the unique nature of C2 operations. Therefore, this model will be used as a 
framework to study human trust in information systems within a command and control 
environment where an Information Warfare threat exists. This modified model, along 
with research hypotheses, are presented in the next section. 
Research Hypotheses 
The hypotheses proposed in this section are largely based on relationships between 


















Figure 5. Adapted Model of Trust drawn from 
(McKnight and Chervaney, 1999) 
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below in Figure 5 on previous page. As mentioned in the previous section, not all of the 
constructs in McKnight and Chervany's model were used in this study.    Of these 
constructs, dispositional trust and situational decision to trust are likely to be useful in 
examining the research question. As evidenced in the automation bias and truth bias 
studies (Mosier et al, 2000; Bios, 1998), people will demonstrate a trusting behavior (e.g. 
shutting down an engine given a fire indication light) if they have a preconceived trust for 
that type automation (fire indication light).   The construct of dispositional trust captures 
this facet of trust. However, it would be useful to determine trusting computers in 
general is more useful to predicting trusting behavior than trusting computers in specific 
situations. The latter is captured in the construct of situational decision to trust. This 
proposed model (see Figure 6 previous page) also includes a construct called external 
safeguards, which is captured in McKnight and Chervany's construct called system trust. 
Finally, a construct of information warfare was included in order to study the effect of 
this military-unique factor on trusting behavior in a C2 environment. The complete 
definitions for each of the constructs in the proposed model can be found in Table 2 on 
the next page. 
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Table 2: Definition of Constructs taken from McKnight and Chervany (1999) 
Construct 1. Situational decision to trust 
Definition: The extent to which one intends to depend a person or object in a given 
situation. 
Construct 2. Dispositional trust (Faith in Technology's Competence) 
Definition: The general tendency of one to believe in the reliability of a person or 
object in a given situation. 
Construct 3. External safeguard 
Definition: The extent to which one believes (consciously or unconsciously) that an 
impersonal safeguard exists, such that it supports their trust a person or object. 
Construct 4. Information warfare 
Definition: One's perception of erroneous or altered information caused by an 
adversary whose intent is to mislead or cause a person to behave in a way 
contrary to how they would have otherwise behaved. 
Construct 5. Trusting behavior 
Definition: An action or inaction that indicates the intent to trust a person or object 
despite the possibility of negative consequences. 
Hypotheses Development 
McKnight and Chevany's model oftrast includes two types of dispositional trust: 
Type A and Type B. As defined earlier in this chapter, type A dispositional trust is a kind 
of general assumption that people or objects are trustworthy and, therefore will have a 
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direct influence on a person's intention to trust and consequently their trusting behavior 
(McKnight and Chervany, 1999). 
Another type of trust offered by McKnight and Chervany (1999) is situational 
decision to trust. Situational decision to trust means that trust has been formed from a 
person's past experience based on a particular situation rather than a belief about a 
specific person or object (Riker, 1971). 
While McKnight and Chervany (1999) show disposition to trust and situational 
decision to trust as two independent constructs, it is likely that a person's disposition to 
trust (type A) will have some affect on their decision to trust information systems in a 
given situation. The reverse of this relationship may also be true. In other words, a 
persons decision to trust a person or object in a given situation may influence their 
general beliefs or attitudes about that person or object. This relationship seems likely 
since both attitudes are formed from some previous experience, and perhaps the same 
experiences (Erikson, 1968; Roter, 1967; McKnight and Chervany, 1999). This study 
proposes that it is likely that disposition to trust and situational decision to trust will be 
positively correlated to each other. 
HI: Disposition to trust Information Systems and situational decision to trust 
are positively correlated with each other. 
The TRA model suggests a person's behavior can be predicted by first 
understanding the person's intention to carry out the behavior, which is determined by 
both the person's attitude and subjective norm (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). However, 
sometimes it is difficult or impossible to measure a person's intention to do something 
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(Morris and Verkatesh, 2000). This is the case in the dynamic and fluid environment of 
military command and control that is being studied here. Additionally, intention to trust 
is often used as a surrogate for behavior when behavior can not be measured (Morris and 
Verkatesh, 2000). Therefore, intention to trust is eliminated from this model and all 
relationships between other constructs and intention to trust will be shown to lead directly 
to trusting behavior. 
As defined earlier, dispositional trust influences a person's trusting behavior. This 
type of disposition to trust is often found in military battle commander's who form a 
general trust for the people and equipment that they work with (Ericson, 1968; Boyd, 
1987). An example of this is a general trust in information systems to provide the 
necessary information for a battle commander to make a decision. This study suggests 
that dispositional trust will have a positive influence on a person's trusting behavior. 
H2: Disposition to trust Information Systems positively influences trusting 
behavior. 
The studies in NDM show evidence that decision-making is situational in nature. 
The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model describes the importance of the situation 
with respect to forming a decision ((Klein, 1988, Drillings and Serfaty, 1997). Boyd's 
(1987) decision-making model supports this theory by suggesting that during the 
orientation stage, the military commander's assessment of the observed information is 
situational in nature. Following the orientation stage, Boyd (1987) suggests military 
commander's make a decision. 
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The literature also suggests that the more positive experiences a decision-maker 
has with objects, like information systems in given situations, the more likely they will 
trust the object (Mosier, Skitka, and Heers, 2000). This phenomenon was observed in 
studies that examined automation bias in airline pilots. Experienced airline pilots tended 
to take action (i.e. trusting behavior) based solely on the information received from an 
automated decision support system in certain situations (Mosier, Skitka, and Burdick, 
2000). Given the findings by Mosier et al (2000) that a positive attitude or belief in a 
system will lead to a behavior, this study proposes that McKnight and Chervany's (1999) 
attitudinal construct of situational decision to trust will positively affect trusting behavior. 
H3:  Situational decision to trust Information Systems positively effects 
trusting behavior. 
The United States military is functionally organized. Each unit has a specific set 
of mission objectives. Often, a unit's mission objective may be to safeguard some other 
unit. Military personnel are conditioned to trust these units do their job so that they may 
in turn accomplish their own mission objectives. Weick and Roberts (1993) observed this 
behavior on the flight deck of a navy aircraft carrier and termed this behavior "collective 
mind." The literature supports this organizational form and mode of operation in that it 
suggests a person's decision to trust is influenced by the belief that some external 
organization or entity exists to provide a safeguard to the decision maker (Luhmann, 
1991; McKnight and Chervany, 1999) However, the literature is not rich in empirical 
studies of this facet of trust. In fact, most of the trust research that explores the human- 
automation trust relationship examines situations where either the automation 
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malfunctions and no external safeguard exists. This study proposes that the construct of 
external safeguards will have a positive effect on a decision-maker's trusting behavior. 
H4:  External Safeguards will have a positive effect on trusting behavior. 
Much has been theorized about the effects of information warfare on decision- 
makers, but little empirical research exists (Van Cleave, 1997; Kuehl, 2000; Whitehead, 
1999). What little empirical evidence does exist, suggests that the perception of 
information warfare events, such as computer viruses or information manipulation, will 
have a negative effect on decision-makers (McCornack et al, 1996; Biros, 1998; Yeung, 
Levine, and Nishiyama, 1999; Seong, Llina, Drury, and Bisantz, 2000). Therefore, this 
study proposes that the perception of an information warfare attack, such as information 
manipulation, will have a negative effect on trusting behavior. 
H5: The presence of information manipulation will have a negative effect on 
trusting behavior. 
Summary 
In summary, the goal of this research was to examine the influence that External 
Safeguards (i.e. System trust) and Information Warfare (i.e. Information Manipulation) 
has on decision-making in a naturalistic decision making environment, as well as 
attitudes such as dispositional trust and situational decision to trust. To examine these 
effects, an experimental design will be presented in the next chapter that incorporates the 
theoretical framework established in this chapter. McKnight's model of Trust (McKnight 
and Chervany, 1999), decision making theories (Orasanu and Connolly, 1993; Boyd, 
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1987; Roman, 1999), and information warfare theories (Whitehead, 1997; McCornack, 
1996; Biros, 1998) were used to build this framework from which trusting behavior can 
be observed and measured. A series of hypotheses were proposed based on supporting 
research, as well as gaps and weaknesses in existing research. 
The following chapter will operationalize the constructs defined in this chapter 
and offer a methodology to capture data that can be used to test the hypotheses presented 
in this chapter.   Finally, the methodology will incorporate the characteristics necessary to 
create a naturalistic military decision-making environment. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
(Experiment 1) 
Overview 
The first chapter of this thesis described the research problem of interest to this 
study.   The second chapter laid a theoretical foundation by presenting a review of trust, 
decision-making, and IW literature and then built a theoretical framework from which the 
research problem could be explored. Finally, a set of hypotheses was offered to predict 
the type of relationships between the constructs of interest. This chapter describes the 
methodology used in the first experiment to test the hypotheses, operationalizes each 
construct of interest by applying the theoretical framework established in Chapter II, and 
defines a set of variables that were used to measure each construct. Finally, the data 
collection process is described, along with the statistical methods used to analyze and 
make inference about the data. The methodology for the second experiment is described 
in Chapter V. 
Experimental Design 
In order to investigate a person's trusting behavior in an IW domain, a military 
command and control (C2) scenario was developed for use with a high-fidelity computer 
simulator, the Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD) simulator developed by 
Aptima, Inc. This high-fidelity system produced a microworld within which subjects 
were immersed into a complex C2 computer simulation (Brehmer and Dorner, 1993). 
Computer simulated microworlds offer a bridge between laboratory and field experiments 
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by providing a realistic and naturalistic environment and greater experimental control. 
While this experiment was conducted in laboratory setting, the high-fidelity DDD system 
closely simulates a real-world C2 decision-making environment (Entin, Kerrigan, 
Serfaty, & Young, 1998). The DDD system allowed for the collection of quantitative 
measures over the course of each experimental trial, as well as measurable attitudes and 
beliefs through a pre and post survey questionnaire. 
The experiment was designed as a between group experiment which manipulated two 
independent variables from the theoretical model described in the last chapter, External 
Safeguard and Information Warfare.   These variables were completely crossed to a 
2 X 2-design configuration as seen in Figure 6 below. Each subject experienced only one 










Treatment Gp 1 Treatment Gp 2 
Treatment Gp 4 Treatment Gp 3 
Figure 6. Group Configurations 
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Each subject was given training on the weapon system concept and computer 
interface. A further description of the training is described in the Tasks and Procedures 
section of this chapter. Following training, each subject was tasked by the experiment 
administrator (acting as an Air Force Research Laboratory field evaluator and reading 
from a script) to perform a hidden-profile, decision-making task that involved the control 
of multiple Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV's) to defend one of four air space 
zones on the computer display (see Appendix 1). Control of each UCAV was performed 
through various user actions on the DDD system. The UCAV system was described to 
the subjects as a new operational C2 system being field tested by Air Force Research 
Laboratories. 
Subjects were tasked to identify incoming air tracks by electronically directing 
UCAVs to move within sensor range. Air tracks are a computer representation of an 
aircraft radar signature displayed on the subject's computer display. If the air track was 
identified as a hostile, they were authorized to attack the target without the need for 
further verification. 
They were told the objective of their mission was to stop all hostile tracks before 
they entered protected airspace (see Appendix 2).   Subjects were told that the UCAV 
computer system could automatically determine the identity of any air track once it was 
within the UCAV's sensor range. They were also told the computer system was 100 
percent accurate in both algorithmic and display processing. 
Subjects were cautioned that information from the UCAV aircraft and the 
computer system traveled across an unclassified local area network (LAN) and was 
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therefore vulnerable to Information Warfare attacks. They were further cautioned that 
the simulation might contain a simulated IW attack against the LAN. Subjects were 
given a means to communicate electronically with an orbiting Air Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) aircraft to verify the identity of air tracks, once the air tracks had been 
identified by their UCAV. 
Five minutes into the simulation all subjects received a threat message from a 
simulated network participant; the Network Security Force (NSF) that indicated an 
attempted attack against the network had occurred (see Appendix 3). During training, 
subjects were told the role of the NSF was to monitor and protect the networks in the 
region against IW attacks. Two new tracks appeared approximately 10 seconds 
following the message from the NSF. For treatment groups three and four, one of these 
tracks appeared as a friendly when in fact it was a hostile. The other track appeared as a 
hostile when it was actually a friendly. If the subjects destroyed the friendly aircraft, a 
visual and audible alarm was triggered indicating a fratricide had occurred. In addition, 
subjects could perceive this error by observing a decrement to their defensive score. 
Indication of the other spoofed track (i.e. hostile track that was spoofed as a 
friendly) included a visual que of a steady decrement to the subject's defensive score if 
the air track entered the subject's protected air space. Additionally, subjects were able to 
perceive the destruction of their assets (i.e. tanker aircraft and bases) once the hostile 
aircraft flew within weapons range of the subjects assets. 
To give the experimental task a sense of realism and urgency, a scenario briefing 
was provided to each subject to read before the start of the experimental trial (see 
Appendix 4). The scenario briefing laid out a realistic military threat environment in 
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which an attack of enemy aircraft loaded with weapons of mass destruction was 
imminent. In addition to the scenario, the experiment facilitator explained the scoring 
system (see Appendix 5) used during the simulation. The scoring system was designed to 
simulate the high-risk environment of combat C2 operations. Subjects were told that 
their overall score would be used to determine the success of the mission. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study using Air Force Company Grade Officers (Ss =10) was performed 
to ensure the experiment was feasible, safe, and met the stated objectives. Air Force 
Company Grade Officers are a superset of the population studied (i.e. Air Battle Manager 
Officers). This test helped identify potential problems with subject reactivity and game 
play. For instance, a manageable number of incoming tracks was determined. It was 
important to find a number of tracks that kept the subjects engaged in the game, without 
falling into one of the common errors of computer-simulated microworlds, task 
saturation (Brehmer and Dorner, 1993). Brehmer and Dorner (1993) define task 
saturation as overwhelming the subjects with too many assigned tasks to perform. This 
type of error could result in measurements of something other than the intended measure 
or a reduction in the strength of experimental manipulations. 
Another finding from the pilot study was that the construct of Trusting Belief 
proved difficult to measure. During the pilot study, subjects complained that they were 
unable to answer questions that measured Trusting Belief in the UCAV system because 
they had no previous experience or frame of reference for this system. Therefore, a 
uniform level of trust in the UCAV operation system was controlled for during the 
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training session. This was accomplished by teaching the subjects about the individual 
components of the UCAV system during training and emphasizing that the UCAV 
system was 100 percent accurate in processing and displaying sensor information. Next, 
the unmanned sensor aircraft were described. Subjects were again told that testing 
proved the unmanned sensor aircraft to be 100 percent accurate. This control was 
checked by the subject's response to a question on the pre-trial multiple-choice test (see 
Appendix 5). 
Subjects 
A random sample (Ss=56) of AW ACS operators were recruited from the 552" 
AW ACS Operations Group at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma to participate in this 
study. The ages of subjects ranged from 19 to 46 years old and their experience ranged 
from 0 to 50 hours of combat C2 experience. Their military ranks ranged from junior 
enlisted to field grade officer. 
Equipment and Facilities 
All experiment sessions were run in an office with no windows and a single 
entrance (see Appendix 7). Each subject performed his or her tasks in a workspace that 
was isolated with a partition system. While each subject could not visually see another 
subject's computer display, the partitions were not sufficient to prevent subjects from 
hearing each other's comments. Therefore, each subject was told that a communications 
blackout was in effect and any verbal communication would alert the enemy to their 
location. Each subject's workspace consisted of a chair, a desk surface, a PC-type laptop 
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computer system loaded with a Linux operating system and DDD software, and quick 
reference sheets that defined icons and scoring information. 
The room was also equipped with a VHS video player and 25" television set. In 
addition, a desktop PC-type computer was setup to run Microsoft's PowerPoint 
application. These items were used during the training portion of the experimental trial. 
Tasks and Procedures 
Three experimental trials were scheduled each day, with the exception of the last 
day, which only had two trials. Each trial lasted approximately two hours (see Figure 8). 
The experiment ran for five consecutive days, resulting in 14 experimental trials. 
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Figure 7 Experimental Time-line 
On the scheduled test day, subjects were instructed to report to the evaluation 
room. Subjects were assigned an operator position (i.e. DM1, DM2, DM3, or DM4) 
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based on the order in which they arrived (see Appendix 7). Upon arrival, each subject 
was asked to sign a log-in sheet and was then directed to an operator position. An 
introductory package was provided to each subject. The package included a standard 
consent form and a biometric data collection form (see Appendix 9 and 10). Subjects 
were asked to fill-out each form before the start of the experimental trial. 
The experiment facilitator (reading from a script) started the trial by explaining 
the purpose of the experiment. The facilitator then showed a 3 Vi minute training video 
on the UCAV aircraft and its concept of operations. Following the video, the experiment 
facilitator went through a PowerPoint training presentation on the desktop PC located in 
the room (see Appendix 11). Following the video, the subjects were given an opportunity 
to ask questions. The subjects were then instructed to take their place at their stations. 
The experiment facilitator instructed each subject to begin the training simulation by 
clicking the Start button. Subjects were individually shown how to perform the various 
functions needed to operate the system. The experiment facilitators freely answered 
questions. This first hands-on session lasted approximately six minutes. Following this 
session, one of the experiment facilitators briefed the subjects on the training mission 
scenario, while the other facilitator prepared the computers for the next session. Once the 
briefing was complete, subjects participated in a 20-minute training simulation session. 
Again, the experiment facilitators provided assistance to subjects on system operation and 
game play rules. Following the training session, subjects were given a set of post- 
training survey forms to complete (see Appendix 12 and 13). They were instructed to put 
the completed forms in the blue folders provided at each station. They were then given a 
5-10 minute break. 
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Following the break, subjects were asked to resume their positions at their 
workstations. The experiment facilitator instructed subjects to read the scenario brief 
(see Appendix 14) and then gave final instructions. Once all subjects indicated they were 
ready to begin, the subjects were instructed to start the simulation. Subjects were 
instructed to raise their hands to request assistance if they encountered a computer 
malfunction or procedural question. Finally, subjects were instructed to remain at their 
workstation at the completion of the experiment until otherwise directed by the 
experiment facilitator. 
When the simulation ended, one of the experiment facilitators saved the 
automatically recorded data logs onto floppy disks, while the other passed out post-trial 
survey forms (see Appendix 15 and 16) and instructed subjects to complete them. Again, 
each subject was asked to put completed forms into the blue folder at their station and 
wait until all of the subjects were finished. 
Once all subjects finished, the experiment administrator revealed the true purpose 
of the experiment. An informal question and answer session was conducted at that time. 
It was interesting to note that even after subjects were told the true purpose of the 
experiment was not to evaluate the UCAV system, but rather to measure trust in an 
automated C2 system, subjects continued to provide opinions and suggestions for the 




The first experiment manipulation was the construct called external safeguards. 
External safeguards was operationalized in the form of a simulated game participant 
called the Network Security Force (NSF). The NSF was described as an external agency 
that was not actually part of the UCAV system. Subjects were told that the NSF's role 
was to monitor and protect the LAN against IW attacks.   The NSF was, in essence, an 
external safeguard that contributed to the subject's sense of normality and confidence by 
providing alerts to the subjects of IW attacks. Treatment groups one and four were told 
by the experiment facilitator that the NSF was very effective (90%) at detecting enemy 
information attacks and defending the network against these attacks. Treatment groups 
two and three were told by the experiment facilitator that the NSF was not very effective 
(60%) in the same tasks. 
The second manipulation, Information Warfare (IW), was operationalized in the 
form of an information manipulation resulting in two spoofing events. Spoofing is a 
tactic whereby the enemy has covertly gained access to the system and manipulates the 
track identity, such that a friendly aircraft appears on the display as an enemy and an 
enemy aircraft appears on the display as a friendly. Treatment groups three and four 
were subject to an information manipulation event during the simulation, while treatment 
groups one and two were not. 
The location of each treatment group was counter-balanced across the four air 
space quadrants. The IW manipulation required the user to perceive an IW attack. The 
IW attack took the form of spoofing the identity of two tracks. To achieve the perception 
of the IW manipulation, the DDD software was modified so that if a user attacked a 
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friendly aircraft (to include a friendly aircraft spoofed as an enemy aircraft) an audible 
alarm would sound followed immediately by a pop-up window that displayed a warning 
message. This message indicated that the AW ACS observed the destruction of a friendly 
aircraft (see Appendix 2). A mouse click action was required to end the audible signal 
and close the pop-up window. The act of ending this signal was used as an indication 
that the user perceived the IW spoofing manipulation. Manipulation checks were 
performed for the External Safeguard manipulation by means of a post-training multiple- 
choice test (see Appendix 5). The IW manipulation was checked through a computer 
generated log that recorded the subject's action of closing the alarm window following a 
fratricide incident. 
The effectiveness of the manipulations was measured by two different methods. 
The effectiveness of the External Safeguard manipulation was measured by a post- 
training multiple-choice test (See Appendix 5, Multiple Choice Test). Three questions on 
this test measured different aspects of the External Safeguard entity in this experiment, 
the Network Security Forces (NSF). The effectiveness of the Information Warfare 
manipulation was measured both by the post-test multiple-choice test referred to above, 
as well as counting the number of spoofing acknowledgment messages sent by subjects 
who experienced the manipulation. 
External Safeguard 
Question 2 of the multiply choice test measured the subject's ability to recall the 
role of the NSF during the simulation. An examination of the test results showed 54 out 
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of 55 respondents answered the question correctly. The one subject who missed the 
question was provided immediate feedback and training on the role of the NSF. 
Question 5 measured the subject's belief that the NSF is an external entity from 
the UCAV system. This check was important because the definition of an external 
safeguard given in Chapter II states that it is an organization, person, or object separate 
from the person or object of trust. An examination of the test results showed 37 out of 55 
respondents answered the question correctly. Of the 18 subjects who missed the 
question, all but one answered the question that included the NSF as part of the UCAV 
system. The subjects who missed the question were provided immediate feedback and 
training on the UCAV system concept. 
Question 11 measured the manipulation meant to set a level of effectiveness for 
the NSF. Out of the 23 subjects who were told the NSF was 90% effective, all 23 
subjects answered the question on question correctly. Out of the 22 subjects who 
responded to the question and were told the NSF was 60% effective, 21 subjects 
answered the question correctly. The one subject who missed the question was provided 
immediate feedback and training on the effectiveness of the NSF. 
Information Warfare 
Question 4 of the multiple-choice test measured the subject's ability to recall the 
concept of Information Manipulation, or spoofing. Of the 55 subjects who responded, 42 
subjects answered the question correctly. The other 12 subjects were provided immediate 
feedback and training on the concept of Information Manipulation. 
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The second means by which the Information Warfare manipulation was checked 
was to ensure the subjects who received a spoofing manipulation perceived the event. 
This measurement was achieved in two ways. First, an automatic pop-up window 
appeared on the subject's computer screen immediately following an attack against the 
spoofed track. The message stated that the track destroyed was actually a friendly 
aircraft. The subject was required to click on a button in order to proceed with the 
simulation. A check of the data logs showed that 20 of 20 subjects who destroyed the 
spoofed track acknowledged the pop-up window message. The second means by which 
this manipulation was measured was by a Request Information message sent by the 
subject to the experiment facilitator who was playing the role of an AW ACS aircraft. Of 
the three subjects who suspected the spoofed track, all three subjects sent a request for 
information to the experiment facilitator and received a response that indicated the true 
identity of the track. 
Hypothesis Measures 
To review, a theoretical framework was presented in Chapter II and a set of 
hypotheses were developed that suggested the manipulation of external safeguards and 



















Figure 8. Adapted Model of Trust drawn from (McKnight and Chervaney, 
Operationalized definitions of the two constructs, external safeguards and IW, 
were given in the Experiment Manipulation section of this chapter. In order to 
operationalize the other constructs of interest, clear and concise definitions for each were 
developed. These definitions were taken from McKnight and Chervany's model of trust 
(1999) and rewritten to reflect the specific objects of trust and situational context of this 
experiment. 
Cognitive phenomena like "attitudes, motivations, expectations, intentions, and 
preferences cannot be observed" (Zikmund, 1984: 222). Therefore, a survey consisting 
item clusters that measured these attitudes was developed and administered before and 
after each experimental trial. The item clusters were developed based on the definitions 
of the constructs given in Table 2 (Chapter II) and adapted from self-reporting 
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measurements developed by McKnight and others to assess the subject's attitudes and 
beliefs.   Dispositional trust and situational decision to trust were operationalized and 
measured through the use of a survey that employed a cluster of items using a five-point 
Likert-like scale (See Table 3 next page). 
Trusting behavior was operationalized in terms of the user's action or inaction 
based on information received from the UCAV system. In this case, trusting behavior 
was measured by examining how many times the user requested identification 
verification from an external source (i.e. the AWACS participant) before taking an action 
or inaction.   Therefore, the act of depending solely on the UCAV system (i.e. not 
contacting AWACS) is an indicator and measure of trusting behavior. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, note that the construct of intention to trust 
found in McKnight and Chervany's (1999) model of trust was not used in this study. In 
this experiment, the act of intending to trust is unique and different for each decision the 
subject makes about attacking or not attacking a track. Therefore, intention to trust could 
not be satisfactorily measured using a pre or post-experiment survey. In addition, if items 
were administered before each decision it is possible that the user may become aware of 
the true purpose of the experiment. 
Table 3. Item Clusters 
Construct: Dispositional trust (Faith in Technology's Competence) 
Definition: The general tendency of users to believe in the technical competence of 
computer systems in general. 
la. My typical approach is to trust [new computer systems] until they prove I 
shouldn't trust them. 
lb . I usually trust [computer systems] until they give me a reason not to trust them. 
lc . I generally give [computer systems] the benefit of the doubt when I first [use] 
them. 
Construct: Situational decision to trust 
Definition: The extent to which a user intends to depend on an operational computer 
system in a real-world operational situation 
2a . I feel I can depend on [computer systems] in [an operational context]. 
2b. [In an operational setting], I can depend on [computer systems] I work with. 
2c. I can always rely on [computer systems] in an [operational setting]. 
2d. When I'm in [a operational environment], I feel I can rely on [the computer 
systems] I work with in that setting. 
2e. I think I can adequately rely on the computer systems as tool in a operational 
setting. 
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Survey Design and Validation 
The pre and post-experiment surveys were developed by employing a set of items 
that were developed to measure the constructs of dispositional trust - faith in 
technological competence and situational decision to trust. A set of three to five survey- 
type items was developed for each construct. A five-point Likert scale was used to 
measure user intentions, attitudes, and expectations. This scale ranged from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) on the left to 5 (Strongly Agree) on the right and 3 (Neutral in the middle). 
Subject experts were used to evaluate the items and ensure the items accurately measure 
the intended constructs. Items that were deemed not adequate measures of a construct 
were discarded. 
The next step in evaluating the survey consisted of reliability and factor analysis. 
To accomplish this, all survey items were randomly listed on a survey form. This form 
was administered to the subjects. The results from the experiment were statistically 
analyzed. A factor analysis was performed to derive a correlation matrix and ensure the 
items loaded on the predicted number of factors. In addition, a reliability analysis was 
performed to derive reliability Coefficient alpha for the items. The reliability analysis 
produced an a>= .72. This reliability level is sufficient for this type of study (Nunnally 
and Bernstein, 1994). 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of the data collected during the experimental trials was done through a 
variety of statistical analyses. A linear regression analysis was used to measure the 
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affects of constructs as a means to predict trusting behavior. This technique was used for 
hypotheses H2, H3, H4, and H5 as defined in Chapter II.   In addition, a correlation 
analysis was performed to test HI. 
Summary 
This chapter described a research method to investigate the theorized relationship 
between external safeguards, information warfare, and trusting behavior. It described the 
experimental methodology, along with the operationalized constructs and a set of 
variables that were used to measure those operationalized constructs. Finally, this 
chapter described how the collected data was analyzed. Next, the results of the analysis 
are presented in Chapter IV. Chapter V describes a second experiment that was designed 
to validate the findings from the first experiment and to test the untested hypothesis from 
Chapter II. Chapter VI presents the results of the analysis for the second experiment. 
Finally, the interpretation and findings of both experiments, along with recommendations 
for future research efforts, are presented in Chapter VII. 
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IV.     ANALYSIS OF DATA 
(Experiment 1) 
Data Analysis 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected during the first experiment 
described in Chapter III. The results of this information in relation to the research 
hypotheses will be presented in Chapter VII. The following sections present the results 
of statistical analysis of the hypotheses under investigation in this experiment. A linear 
regression analysis was performed to determine what, if any effect each construct had in 
predicting the dependent variable, trusting behavior. A check for normality was 
performed on the dependent variable and the summary of this result can be found in 
Figure 10 on the next page. As described in Chapter III, trusting behavior was measured 
by counting the number of times the subject requested verification information from 
AW ACS. Therefore, a low number of contacts indicates a high trusting behavior and a 
high number of contacts indicates a low trusting behavior. This type of count data results 
in a Poisson distribution which is, by definition, not normally distributed and was 
therefore transformed by taking the log of each count total. This log transformation 
resulted in a more normal distribution. 
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[Moments    J 
Mean -5.63364 
SdDev 4.98818 
Std Error Mean 0.67261 
Upper 95% Mean ^».28515 
Lower 95% Mean -6.98213 
N 55.00000 







Figure 9 Descriptive Statistics of Trusting behavior Data 
As can be seen from Figure 9, the distribution is not normal and indicates a high 
degree of kurtosis with a value of-1.53684. Kurtosis is a measure of the extent to which 
observations cluster around a central point. While the degree of the kurtosis was much 
higher than anticipated, kurtosis was expected given that the default behavior being 
measured was the act of not contacting AW ACS. The violation of the assumption of 
normality and the high degree of kurtosis resulted in the need to perform a log-linear 
regression analysis on the data. 
The log-linear regression analysis model consists of the following predictors: 
Constant, disposition to trust (DT), situational decision to trust (SDT), information 
warfare (IW), external safeguard (ES). The dependent variable was coded with either a 1 
(AWACS contacted) or a 0 (AWACS not contact). A log-linear regression provides the 
odds of predicting the value of the dependent variable, as opposed to the probability of 
predicting the value of the dependent variable. A log-linear regression analysis begins 
with a model consisting of only the constant. The results of this model give the odds of 
predicting either AWACS was contacted or AWACS was not contacted at 65%. This 
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model was significant at the 0.050 level (df=l, p=.024). The next step in the log-linear 
regression analysis is to create a new model by adding the independent variables. The 
results of the second model show that by adding the independent variables, the odds of 
predicting the value of trusting behavior goes up to 78.2%. This means that the 
independent variables add some explanatory value to the model such that the odds of 
predicting trusting behavior increases by 13.2%. The summary statistics for this second 
model give a Cox & Snell R2 = .323 and the Nagelkerke R2 = .446. 
Relationship Between Disposition to trust and Situational decision to trust (HI) 
Hypothesis HI predicts a positive correlation between disposition to trust and 
situational decision to trust. A review of the correlation analysis in Table 4 shows a 
significant positive correlation between disposition to trust and situational decision to 
trust at a significance level of p < 0.001.   This finding supports Hypothesis 1 and 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Independent Variables 
Correlations M SD SDT DT 
SD 3.2764 .6583 1.000 .372*** 
DT 3.8303 .5840 .372*** 1.000 
* p < .10, ** p< .050, and *** p< .001 
suggests that if a military commander trusts computers in general, they will also tend to 
trust computers in a command and control environment. 
Relationship Between Disposition to trust and Trusting behavior (H2) 
Hypothesis H2 predicted disposition to trust would have a positive effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis shown in Table 5 on the next 
page does not show disposition to trust to be significant (p = .401, ß = -.574) at the 0.05 
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level. This finding does not support Hypothesis 2 which suggests that a military 
commander's trust of computers in general is a useful predictor of their willingness to 
trust information presented to them on a C2 information system. 
Table 5 Log-linear Regression Analysis Summary of IW, ES, SDT, and DT as 
Determinants of Trusting Behavior 
ß S.E. Wald df P 
Stepl IW -9.455 42.058 .051 .822 
ES .127 .852 .022 .881 
DT -.574 .684 .706 .401 
SDT -1.084 .596 3.311 .069 
Constant 5.099 2.826 3.257 .071 
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: IW, ST, IW_ST, DSFT, SD. 
Relationship Between Situational decision to trust and Trusting behavior (H3) 
Hypothesis H3 predicted situational decision to trust would have a positive effect 
on trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis shown in Table 5 above 
shows situational decision to trust to be marginally significant (p = .069, ß = -1.084) at 
the 0.05 level. This finding support Hypothesis 3 which suggests that a military 
commander's trust in computers in a C2 environment is a useful predictor of their 
willingness to trust information presented on a C2 information system. 
Effect of External Safeguards on Trusting behavior (H4) 
Hypothesis H4 predicted external safeguards would have a positive effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis (see Table 5 above) show 
external safeguards to be significant (p = .881, ß = .127) at the 0.05 level. Therefore, 
these findings offer no support for Hypothesis 4 which suggested a commander's belief 
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in the effectiveness of an external safeguard to a C2 information system would have a 
positive effect on their willingness to trust information presented on the C2 information 
system. 
Effect of Information Warfare on Trusting behavior (H5) 
Hypothesis H5 predicted information warfare would have a negative effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis (see Table 5 above) shows 
information warfare not significant (p = .882, ß = -9.455) at the 0.05 level. Therefore, 
there is no evidence to support Hypothesis 5 which suggests that the perceived presence 
of an information warfare attack, such as the manipulation of air track data, has a 
negative effect on a military commanders willingness to trust the information received 
from a C2 information system. 
Conclusion 
The violation of the assumption of normality for the trusting behavior data 
prompted the use of log-linear regression analysis to determine if any of the independent 
variables would increase the odds of predicting trusting behavior. Of the four 
independent variables tested in this model, only situational decision to trust was a 
significant predictor of trusting behavior. However, the correlation analysis between 
situational decision to trust and dispositional trust was also significant and supported 
hypothesis HI. 
The problem with the normality of trusting behavior led to a review of the 
experimental design in order to identify possible causes. This review identified several 
possible causes for this problem and revealed some possible new problems. Discussions 
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with some of the subjects following the experiment indicate that they were so busy 
concentrating on performing the required tasks (i.e. moving aircraft, attacking, refueling, 
returning to base, identifying tracks, etc) that they either did not have time to contact 
AW ACS for verification or had forgotten about the option to contact AW ACS. This may 
have resulted in the low number of contacts made with AW ACS. Another possible 
problem with the experimental design may have been the timing of the survey questions. 
It is possible that bias was introduced by administering situational decision to trust and 
dispositional trust questions together on the same survey and following the training on 
the UCAV system. The statements made during the training about the effectiveness of 
the UCAV system may have biased the subject's responses with regard to computers in 
general.. Therefore, a second experiment was designed to validate the findings from the 
first experiment and eliminate the possible problems identified above. The next chapter 
describes the second experiment and its design. 
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V.  METHODOLOGY 
(Experiment 2) 
Overview 
As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the methodology used in first 
experiment may have resulted in experimental effects (e.g. task saturation). Additionally, 
the metric used to measure trusting behavior may not have been robust enough to study 
the research hypotheses. Finally, the timing of the survey instruments may have 
introduced bias into the experiment. Therefore, a second experiment was designed with 
the same basic goals as the first. 
This chapter describes the second experiment, which tested the same hypotheses 
described as presented in Chapter II. It operationalizes each construct of interest by 
applying the same theoretical framework and defining a modified set of variables that 
were used to measure these constructs. Finally, the data collection process is described, 
along with the statistical methods used to analyze and make inference about the data. 
Experimental Design 
A similar military command and control (C2) scenario was developed for use with 
the same high-fidelity computer simulator used in the first experiment. This was done in 
order to allow for easier comparison of results between the two experiments. This 
experiment collected quantitative measures of subject behaviors over the course of each 
experimental trial, as well as measurable attitudes and beliefs through a pre and post 
survey questionnaire in the same basic fashion as the first experiment. This experiment 
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maintained the same between group design as the first experiment in which the same two 
independent variables were manipulated.   These variables were completely crossed to a 2 
X 2-design configuration as seen in Figure 10. Each subject experienced only one of the 
four possible conditions. The trials were counter-balanced in order to ensure a random 
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Figure 10. Group Configurations 
Each subject was given training on the weapon system concept and computer 
interface. A further description of the training is described in the Tasks and Procedures 
section of this chapter. Following training, each subject was tasked by the experiment 
administrator (acting as an Air Force Research Laboratory field evaluator and reading 
from a script) to perform a hidden-profile, decision-making task that involved the control 
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of multiple fixed Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) sites and radar sites to defend a 
designated air space on the computer display (see Appendix 13). Control of each SAM 
site was performed through various user actions on the DDD system. Subjects were told 
the SAM sites and radar sites were part of a deployed operational Air Defense Unit 
(ADU) were under their direct control. 
Subjects were tasked to identify incoming air tracks by comparing the icon 
information from the graphical display with a list of automated electronic messages sent 
by the radar sites. If the air track was identified and confirmed by the subject as a hostile, 
they were authorized to attack the target using one of their SAM sites. Subjects were told 
the objective of their mission was to stop all hostile tracks before they entered protected 
airspace. Subjects were further told that the while the computer system would 
automatically determine the identity of all air tracks, it was possible for the automated 
messages sent to the computer system to be manipulated by the enemy.   The number of 
tasks required to perform their mission were substantially reduced in this experiment in 
order to reduce the potential problem of task saturation observed in the first experiment. 
Unlike the first experiment where the IW threat and network defender were 
simulated, the experiment administrator introduced two people to the subjects. This was 
done following the introduction part of the training. Subjects were told these two people 
would be playing the role of the network attacker and the other as network defender. 
Subjects were then told these individuals would be located in the next room where they 
would perform their tasks. The experiment administrator instructed the subjects that they 
should expect to receive electronic messages from the network defender if he or she 
detected a network attack by the attacker. In actuality, both of these people were 
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portraying the role of subjects. Following this explanation, these two people left the 
room and performed no further part in the experiment. As in the first experiment, the IW 
spoofing attacks were scripted into the scenario. This change was made in order to 
strengthen the salience of the IW and external safeguard manipulations. 
Also unlike the first experiment, subjects were not given a means to contact 
another party in order to confirm the identity of the tracks. Recall that the contact of the 
outside party (AWAC) was used in the first experiment as the measure of trusting 
behavior. Due to the problems identified in the last chapter with this measure (i.e. the 
measure resulted in only one or two states: contacted or not contracted), a more robust 
and descriptive measure was developed for this experiment. 
This new measure was collected by requiring subjects to set a confidence level for 
each hostile track before initiating an attack. The confidence level was a scale from 1 to 
5, where 1 represented very low confidence in the track identity and 5 represented very 
high confidence in the track identity. This confidence level was also tied to the scoring 
system so that points were calculated as a function of confidence level. Points were 
received when tracks were correctly assessed and points subtracted when tracks were 
incorrectly assessed. 
As in the first experiment, all subjects received a threat message from the network 
defender, the Network Security Force (NSF), approximately five minutes into the 
simulation. This message indicated an attempted attack against the network had occurred 
(see Appendix 14). Following this message, four spoofed tracks would appear for 
subjects receiving the IW manipulation. These tracks were depicted graphically and by 
electronic message as hostile aircraft when; in fact, they were friendly aircraft. If the 
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subjects destroyed the friendly aircraft, a visual and audible alarm was triggered 
indicating a fratricide had occurred. In addition, subjects were able to perceive this error 
by observing the loss of points to their defensive score. 
To give the experimental task a sense of realism and urgency, a scenario briefing 
was provided to each subject to read before the start of the experimental trial (see 
Appendix 15). The scenario briefing laid out a realistic military threat environment in 
which an imminent attack by enemy aircraft was expected. Then the experiment 
facilitator explained the scoring system (see Appendix 16) used during the simulation. 
As mentioned earlier, the scoring system was tied to the confidence level assignments 
and was designed to simulate the high-risk environment of combat operations. Subjects 
were told their overall score would be used to determine the success of the mission. 
Pilot Study 
A pilot study using Air Force Company Grade Officers (Ss =10) was performed 
to ensure the experiment was feasible, safe, and met the stated objectives. This test 
helped ensure problems identified in the first experiment did not reoccur and new 
problems with subject reactivity and game play were not introduced. 
Findings from the pilot study resulted in a reduction in the number of air tracks 
from 48 in the first experiment to 23 in this experiment. Additionally, post-interviews 
with the pilot study subjects were used to gage the perceived level of task saturation. 
Findings from these post-interviews found that subjects were comfortable with the speed 
of the game and task workload. This was important given the observations from the first 
experiment where it is possible that task saturation errors may have occurred (Brehmer 
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and Domer, 1993). Recall that Brehmer and Domer (1993) defines task saturation as 
overwhelming the subjects with too many assigned tasks to perform. This type of error 
could result in the measurement of something other than the intended measure.   Finally, 
a post-hoc analysis of the pilot study data was performed to ensure no violation of 
normality was present in the new measure for trusting behavior (i.e. confidence ratings of 
1 to 5). This analysis showed the confidence level data were normally distributed. 
Subjects 
A sample (Ss=38) of Air Force officers were recruited from the Air War College 
and Aerospace Basic Course at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama and from the 
Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio to participate in this 
study. The ages of subjects ranged from 24 to 56 years old and their military ranks 
ranged from Second Lieutenant to Colonel. 
Equipment and Facilities 
All experiment sessions were run in a conference room with a single entrance. 
Each subject performed his or her tasks in an individual workspace around a conference 
table. While each subject could not visually see another subject's computer display, their 
proximity to each other could have resulted in their hearing each other's comments. 
Therefore, each subject was told that a communications blackout was in effect. Each 
subject's workspace consisted of a chair, a desk surface, a PC-type laptop computer 
system loaded with a Linux operating system and DDD software, and quick reference 
sheets that defined icons and scoring information. The room was also equipped with a 
desktop PC-type computer with overhead projection capabilities and setup to run 
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Microsoft's PowerPoint application. These items were used during the training portion 
of the experimental trial. 
Tasks and Procedures 
Three experimental trials were scheduled each day at Maxwell AFB, Alabama 
and one to three trials each day for Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Each scheduled session 
had between one and four subjects. Each trial lasted approximately one and half-hours 
(see Figure 11). The experiment ran for five consecutive days at Maxwell AFB, Alabama 
and resulted in 32 experimental trials. The remaining eight experimental trials were run 
at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio over a period of two weeks. Treatments were randomly 
assigned by means of a randomized block design (see Appendix 17). 
On the scheduled test day, subjects were instructed to report to the evaluation 
room. Subjects were assigned a workspace position based on the order in which they 
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Figure 11 Experimental Time-line (Experiment 2) 
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arrived and were instructed to sign a log-in sheet. An introductory package was provided 
to each subject. The package included a standard consent form, a biometric data 
collection form, and survey 1 (see Appendix 18, 19, and 20). Subjects were asked to fill- 
out each form before the start of the experimental trial. 
The experiment facilitator (reading from a script) started the trial by giving a brief 
explanation of the experiment. The experiment facilitator then instructed subjects to read 
along with the scenario brief while the facilitator read it out load. Following the scenario 
briefing, the experiment facilitator answered any questions and then instructed subjects to 
complete survey 2 (see Appendix 21).   Once the surveys were complete, the experiment 
facilitator went through a PowerPoint training presentation on the desktop PC located in 
the room (see Appendix 22).   Following the training, each subject was given an 
opportunity to ask questions. Subjects were then instructed to complete survey 3 (see 
Appendix 23). The subjects were then instructed to take their place at their stations. The 
experiment facilitator instructed each subject to begin the training simulation by clicking 
the Start button. Subjects were individually shown how to perform the various functions 
needed to operate the system. The experiment facilitators freely answered questions. 
This first hands-on session lasted approximately five minutes. Following this session, 
one of the experiment facilitators briefed the subjects on the training mission scenario, 
while the other facilitator prepared the computers for the next session. Once the briefing 
was complete, subjects participated in a 20-minute training simulation session. Again, 
the experiment facilitators provided assistance to subjects on system operation and game 
play rules. 
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Following the training session, subjects were reminded that the two people posing 
as subjects would be participating in the next room. Subjects were then told the 
effectiveness of the experiment assistant posing as the network defender. This 
effectiveness was either 97% effective in detecting enemy information warfare attacks 
and defending the network or 57% effective depending on the external safeguard 
manipulation the subject received. These levels were increased slightly from the first 
experiment for the effective manipulation and decreased slightly for the ineffective 
manipulation in order an attempt to strengthen the manipulation. Once all subjects 
indicated they were ready to begin, the subjects were instructed to start the simulation. 
Subjects were instructed to raise their hands to request assistance if they encountered a 
computer malfunction or procedural question. Finally, subjects were instructed to remain 
at their workstation at the completion of the experiment until otherwise directed by the 
experiment facilitator. 
When the simulation ended, one of the experiment facilitators saved the recorded 
data logs onto floppy disks. The other experiment administrator revealed the true 
purpose of the experiment. An informal question and answer session was conducted at 
that time. It was interesting to note that nearly all of the subjects confessed that they 
believed there were actual people trying to attack and defend the network from the other 
room. 
Experiment Manipulations 
The experiment manipulations were the same as in the first experiment. The first 
experiment manipulation was the construct called External Safeguards. External 
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Safeguards was operationalized in the form of the experiment assistant posing as the 
game participant called the Network Security Force (NSF). The NSF was described as an 
external agency that was not actually part of the ADU. As in the first experiment, this 
was done to ensure the subjects could separate the NSF from the ADU system. Subjects 
were told that the NSF's role was to monitor and protect the LAN against IW attacks. 
The NSF was, in essence, an external safeguard that contributed to the subject's sense of 
normality and confidence by providing alerts to the subjects of IW attacks. Treatment 
groups one and four were told by the experiment facilitator that the NSF was very 
effective (97%) in detecting enemy information attacks and defending the network. 
Treatment groups two and three were told by the experiment facilitator that the NSF was 
not very effective (57%) in the same tasks. 
The second manipulation, IW, was operationalized in the form of an information 
manipulation resulting in spoofing events. Recall that spoofing is a tactic whereby the 
enemy has covertly gained access to the system and manipulates the track identity, such 
that a friendly aircraft appears on the display as an enemy. Treatment groups three and 
four were subject to four information manipulation events during the simulation, while 
treatment groups one and two received none. The number of spoofing events was 
increased from the two in the first experiment to four in the second experiment in order to 
strengthen this manipulation. 
The IW manipulation required the user to perceive an IW attack. To achieve the 
perception of the IW manipulation, the DDD software was modified so that if a user 
attacked a friendly aircraft (to include a friendly aircraft spoofed as an enemy aircraft) an 
audible alarm would sound followed immediately by a pop-up window that displayed a 
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warning message. This message indicated that the Air Operation Center (AOC) observed 
the destruction of a friendly aircraft (see Appendix 24). A mouse click action was 
required to end the audible signal and close the pop-up window. The act of canceling this 
signal was used as an indication that the user perceived the IW spoofing manipulation. 
External Safeguard 
The multiple-choice test from the first experiment was modified slightly and used 
in the second experiment to measure the effectiveness of the two manipulations. 
Unfortunately, the question that checked to see if the subjects were able to recall the 
effectiveness of the NSF was accidentally omitted. Question 1 of the multiply choice test 
measured the subject's ability to recall the role of the NSF during the simulation. An 
examination of the test results showed 38 out of 38 respondents answered the question 
correctly. Question 4 measured the subject's ability to exclude including the NSF from 
the UCAV system concept. This question establishes the concept of the NSF being an 
external entity.   An examination of the test results showed 38 out of 38 respondents 
answered the question correctly. 
Information Warfare 
The same check used to check the IW manipulation in the first experiment were 
used in the second experiment. Question 3 of the multiple-choice test measured the 
subject's ability to recall the concept of Information Manipulation, or spoofing. Of the 
38 subjects who responded, 36 subjects answered the question correctly. 
The second means by which the Information Warfare manipulation was checked 
was to ensure the subjects who received a spoofing manipulation perceived the event. 
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This measurement was achieved in two ways. First, an automatic pop-up window 
appeared on the subject's computer screen immediately following an attack against the 
spoofed track. The messaged stated that the track destroyed was actually a friendly 
aircraft. The subject was required to click on a button in order to proceed with the 
simulation. A check of the data logs showed that 20 of 20 subjects who destroyed the 
spoofed track acknowledged the pop-up window message. 
Hypothesis Measures 
To review, a theoretical framework was presented in Chapter II and a set of 
hypotheses were developed that suggested the manipulation of External Safeguards and 
Information Warfare in a military C2 environment will affect a user's Trusting Behavior 
(see Figure 12 below). Operationalized definitions of the two constructs, External 
Safeguards and Information Warfare, were given in the Experiment Manipulation section 



















Figure 12. Adapted Model of Trust drawn from (McKnight and Chervaney, 
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Cognitive phenomena like "attitudes, motivations, expectations, intentions, and 
preferences cannot be observed" (Zikmund, 1984: 222). Therefore, a survey consisting 
item clusters that measured these attitudes was developed and administered during the 
experimental trial. However, Chapter IV suggested that the survey used to collect 
attitudinal measures for the constructs of dispositional trust and situational decision may 
have resulted in bias. Therefore, a separate survey was created for each construct and 
administered in the order shown in Figure 12 on the previous page. Additionally, a new 
survey was created in an attempt to measure the construct of trusting belief. The item 
clusters were developed based on the definitions of the constructs given in Table 9 and 
adapted from the same or similar self-reporting measurements developed by McKnight 
and others and that were used in the first experiment. 
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Table 6. Item Clusters 
Construct: Dispositional Trust (Faith in Technology's Competence) 
Definition: The general tendency of users to believe in the technical competence of 
computer systems in general. 
la. If you initiate a task for the average computer system to perform, the computer 
system will finish it correctly. 
lb. I believe that most computer systems are consistent. 
lc. Most computer systems are reliable. 
Id. I believe that most computer systems are technically competent. 
le. I feel I can depend on most computer systems. 
If. I can trust most computer systems. 
Construct: Situational Decision to Trust 
Definition: The extent to which a user intends to depend on an operational computer 
system in a real-world operational situation 
2a. In a command and control environment like described in the scenario brief, I 
believe computers can be relied upon to help commanders make operational decisions. 
2b. I feel I can depend on computer systems to provide timely and accurate 
information to battle commanders in a combat situation. 
2c. In a command and control setting like the one described in the scenario, I feel 
that I can adequately trust information received from most computer systems. 
2d. I believe that most computer systems used in deployable battle cabs are secure 
enough to trust in combat situations. 
2e. I feel most computer systems used in command and control units are 
dependable. 
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Table fi.  Tte.m Clusters (Continued") 
Construct: Trusting Belief 
Definition: The extent to which a user believes and has confidence 
or object. 
in a specific person 
3a. The DDD computer system is predictable. 
3b. The DDD computer system is consistent. 
3c. The DDD computer system is technically competent. 
3d The DDD computer system has integrity. 
3e. The DDD computer system is reliable. 
3f. The DDD computer system is dependable 
3g. I can trust the DDD computer system. 
Dispositional trust, situational decision to trust, and trusting belief were each 
operationalized and measured through the use of a separate survey that employed a 
cluster of items using a seven-point Likert-like scale. Note that the scale was changed 
from a five-point scale in the first experiment in order to increase the sensitivity of the 
measures. 
Trusting Behavior was operationalized in terms of the confidence-level they 
assigned to each hostile track. Confidence levels have been used in other research as a 
measure of trust (Bisantz, Ann M., James Llinas, Younho Seong, Richard Finger, and 
Jiun-Yin Jian, 2000). 
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Survey Design 
The surveys employed a set of items that were developed to measure the constructs of 
dispositional trust - faith in technological competence, situational decision to trust, and 
trusting belief. A set of three to five survey-type items was developed for each construct. 
A seven-point Likert scale was used to measure user intentions, attitudes, and 
expectations. This scale ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) on the left to 7 (Strongly 
Agree) on the right and 4 (Neutral in the middle).   As in the first experiment, a reliability 
analysis was performed to derive the reliability for the items.    The reliability analysis 
produced an a >= .67. While not as strong as what was found in the first experiment, the 
reliability of the series are sufficient for this type of study (Nunnally and Bernstein, 
1994). 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of the data collected during the experimental trials was done using the 
same statistical methods in Chapter IV. All of the following tests were performed on the 
experiment data to evaluate each of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter II. A linear 
regression analysis was used to measure the affects of constructs as a means to predict 
trusting behavior. This technique was used for hypotheses H2, H3, H4, and H5 as 
defined in Chapter II.   In addition, a correlation analysis was performed to test HI and a 
linear regression analysis was again used to examine the effects of each construct on the 
dependent variable, trusting behavior. 
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Summary 
This chapter described a research method to investigate the research problem and 
hypotheses presented in Chapter II. It described the experimental methodology, along 
with the operationalized constructs and a set of variables that were used to measure those 
operationalized constructs and compared these to the first experimental methodology 
used for the first experiment. Finally, this chapter described how the collected data was 
analyzed.   The results of the analysis described in this chapter are described in Chapter 
VI. Chapter VII interprets and findings of experiments, the limitations of both, and 
recommendations for future research efforts. 
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VI.     ANALYSIS OF DATA 
(Experiment 2) 
Data Analysis 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected during the second 
experiment as described in Chapter V. The results of this information in relation to the 
research hypotheses will be compared with the result from Chapter IV in Chapter VII. 
The following sections present the results of statistical analysis of the hypotheses under 
investigation in this experiment. A linear regression analysis was performed to determine 
what, if any effect each construct had in predicting the dependent variable, trusting 
behavior. A check for normality was performed on the dependent variable and the 
summary of this result can be found in Figure 14 on the next page. 
As described in Chapter V, trusting behavior was measured by the confidence 
level given to each track prior to a decision. As can be seen from Figure 14, while the 
distribution of this data is normal, the graph is skewed to the right with a value of-1.812. 
The degree of the skewness was anticipated given that the score system was tied to the 
confidence level. In other words, the higher the confidence level the higher the score if 
the decision was correct. Additionally, the higher the confidence level the greater the 
decrement to the score if the decision is wrong. Von Neumann's game theory suggests 
that rational people will use strategies to maximize their utility (Von Neumann, J. & 
Morgenstern, 1944). In this case, the utility is the score, therefore the number of assigned 
confidence levels would, according to game theory, be generally higher. 
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The regression analysis model consists of the following predictors: Constant, 
disposition to trust, situational decision to trust, disposition to trust * situational decision 
to trust, information warfare, and external safeguard. The dependent variable was the 
mean confidence level over the course of the experiment. 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: Attack Confidence Level 
Std. Dev = .93 
Mean = 0.00 
smamm N = 38.00 
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Figure 13. Trusting Behavior Normality Analysis 
The regression analysis model consists of the same predictors as used in the 
Chapter IV regression model: Constant, disposition to trust (DT), situational decision to 
trust (SDT), information warfare (IW), and external safeguard (ES). However, the 
dependent variable used in this model was the confidence level assigned to each air track 
by the subject prior to making a decision (i.e. trusting behavior). The results from the 
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regression analysis show the model to be significant at the 0.050 level (df=4, F=2.788, 
p=0.042). 
Relationship Between Disposition to trust and Situational decision to trust (HI) 
Hypothesis HI predicts a positive correlation between disposition to trust and 
situational decision to trust.   A review of the correlation analysis in Table 7 below shows 
a significant positive correlation at a significance level of p<0.01 level (1-tailed) between 
a subject's disposition to trust computers in and their situational decision to trust 
computers in a specific situation. This finding supports Hypothesis 1 and suggests that if 
a military commander trusts computers in general, they will also tend to trust computers 
in a command and control environment. 
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Independent Variables 
Correlations M SD SDT DT 
SD 4.8579 .8278 1.000 .603*** 
DT 5.3421 .7323 .603*** 1.000 
* p< .10, ** p< .050, and *** p< .001 
Relationship Between Disposition to trust and Trusting behavior (H2) 
Hypothesis H2 predicted disposition to trust would have a positive effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis shown in Table 8 on the next 
page shows disposition to trust to not be significant (p = ..761, ß = .060) at the 0.05 level 
of significance. This finding does not support Hypothesis 2 which suggests that a 
military commander's trust of computers in general is a useful predictor of their 
willingness to trust information presented to them on a C2 information system. 
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Table 8 Regression Analysis Summary of IW, ES, SDT, DT, and DT*SDT as 
Determinants of Trusting Behavior 
Experiment 2 (Maxwell AFB) 
R2 AR2 ß Significance 
.253 .162 
IW ..007 
ES -.282 * 
SDT .353 * 
DT .060 
* p< .10, ** p< .050, and *** p< .001 
Relationship Between Situational decision to trust and Trusting behavior (H3) 
Hypothesis H3 predicted situational decision to trust would have a positive effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis shown in Table 8 above shows 
situational decision to trust to be marginally significant (p = .076, ß = .353) at the 0.05 
level of significance. This finding supports Hypothesis 3 which suggests that a military 
commander's trust in computers in a C2 environment is a useful predictor of their 
willingness to trust information presented to them on a C2 information system. 
Effect of External Safeguards on Trusting behavior (H4) 
Hypothesis H4 predicted external safeguards would have a positive effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis shows external safeguards is 
marginally significant (p = .077, ß = -.282) at the 0.05 level of significance. However, 
the beta coefficient is the opposite from what was predicted in Hypothesis 4. That is to 
say, while there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that a military commander's 
belief in the effectiveness of an external safeguard is a useful predictor of their 
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willingness to trust information presented to them on a C2 information system, there does 
appear to be some suggestion that the opposite may be true. 
Effect of Information Warfare on Trusting behavior (H5) 
Hypothesis H5 predicted information warfare would have a negative effect on 
trusting behavior. The results from the regression analysis shown in Table 8 above 
shows information warfare not to be significant (p = .965, ß = .007) at the 0.05 level of 
significance. Therefore, there is no evidence to support Hypothesis 5 which suggests that 
the perceived presence of an information warfare attack, such as the manipulation of air 
track data, has a negative effect on a military commander's willingness to trust the 
information received from a C2 information system. 
Conclusion 
The findings from this data analysis show some significant results and are 
discussed in the next chapter concerning the experimental hypotheses. Additionally, the 
results from the first and second experiment will be compared and discussed in Chapter 
VE. Finally, Chapter VE will present some limitations of each experiment and offer 
some suggestions for follow-on research. 
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VII.     FINDINGS 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the findings from the data analyses from the two 
experiments with respect to the research hypotheses offered in Chapter II. Next, 
limitations of the research experiments are discussed. Finally, proposals are offered for 
further research. The research question for this study was what affect external safeguards 
has on human-information systems trust in an information warfare domain. Five 
hypotheses were developed in Chapter II and tested in the two experiments described in 
Chapters 3 and 5. The conclusions of each of these research questions are presented 
below: 
Dispositional trust and situational decision to trust are positively correlated (HI) 
The findings from the first experiment showed a significant positive correlation 
between dispositional trust and situational decision to trust (p = .003, Pearson 
Correlation = .372). The second experiment supported this finding with a significant 
positive correlation (p = .000, Pearson Correlation = .603). While this relationship is not 
shown in McKnight and Chervany's (1999) model of trust, it is consistent with the 
definitions given in their model and with that of this study. Remember that dispositional 
trust was defined in this study as a general tendency to trust computers, while situational 
decision to trust was defined as a tendency to trust computer is specific situations. The 
increase in the correlation values from the first experiment to the second experiment may 
be due to the modified question sets used in the second experiment. Despite this, the 
83 
correlation results from both experiments suggest that if a military commander has a 
general tendency to trust computers, then he or she would also have a tendency to trust 
them in command and control situations. 
Disposition to trust will have a positive effect on trusting behavior (H2) 
Results from the first experiment showed dispositional trust to be not significant 
in the linear regression analysis (p = .401, ß = -.574) at the .05 level. The second 
experiment also showed no significant effect at the 0.05 level (p = .307, ß = .060). 
These findings were inconsistent with both McKnight and Chervany's (1999) model of 
trust and the model presented in this paper.   The failure of this facet of trust to show a 
significant effect on trusting behavior seems to indicate that while a military commander 
may trust computers in general, this trust does not carry over into the C2 environment. 
Situational decision to trust will positively affect trusting behavior (H3) 
The analysis of the data from the first experiment showed situational decision to 
trust to have a significant effect on the regression model (p = .069, ß = -1.084) at the 0.1 
level. Likewise, the second experiment showed a significant positive effect (p = .076, ß 
= .309) at the 0.1 level. The findings of these two experiments are consistent with 
McKnight and Chervany's model of trust and the model presented in Chapter II. These 
findings suggest that a military commander's trust in computers in a C2 environment is a 
good predictor of their trusting behavior. This is consistent with the OODA Loop model 
of decision-making which suggests that when a military commander is orienting 
information into possible courses of action, they try to match the current situation with 
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their past experience in similar situation (Boyd, 1987). In order words, the situational 
context of using computers is a good predictor of trusting behavior. 
External safeguards have a positive effect on trusting behavior (H4) 
The analysis from the first experiment showed no significant negative effect in the 
regression model (p = .881, ß = .127 . However, the analysis from the second experiment 
did find a significant effect on the regression model (p = .077, ß = -.406), but showed an 
unexpected negative effect in the beta coefficient. External safeguard was 
operationalized the same way in the first and second experiment with only one difference. 
In the first experiment, the subjects were told the external safeguard was simulated by a 
computer with a programmed effectiveness rate (i.e. either 90% effective in protecting 
the network or 60% effective). Subjects in the second experiment were introduced to a 
person posing as the external safeguard and were told that the person had an effectiveness 
rating (i.e. either 97% effective in protecting the network or 57% effective) that was 
achieved during the practice session of the experiment. The significant negative effect 
found in the second experiment suggests that groups who were told the person protecting 
the network was highly effective tended to assign lower confidence levels than those who 
were told the person was not effective. 
The unexpected negative effects from these two experiments may be explained in 
part by the affect of unfulfilled expectations. Muir (1994) describes trust as the expected 
or predicted behavior by a person or object. This expectation is developed over time by 
observations of actual behavior. Therefore, when a subject saw a hostile track on the 
computer display, shot it down, and received positive feedback, the subject's expectation 
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of future information received from the computer display continued to be positive. 
However, if the subject's expectations were unfulfilled by the computer system, it is 
likely that the subject would tend to be distrusting of future information received from the 
computer display. This affect of unfulfilled expectations may be have been strong 
enough and lasted long enough to account for the unexpected correlation findings. This 
is what was observed in Muir's (1994) research and supported in other research (Szoyna 
and Scommell, 1993). 
Additionally, the failure of this manipulation to show a significant effect on the 
regression model in the first experiment may be due to an additional factor. As 
mentioned at the end of Chapter IV, the first experiment may have introduced too many 
tasks for the subjects to perform and resulted in an experimental anomaly called task 
saturation (Brehmer and Dorner, 1993). If the subjects were over tasked, it is possible 
that their failure to contact AW ACS may be a result of spending too much time on the air 
defense task and forgetting about the option to contact AW ACS. 
Information warfare has a negative effect on trusting behavior (H5) 
The analysis from the first experiment found no significant negative effect 
between information warfare and trusting behavior (p = .882, ß = -9.455). The analysis 
from the second experiment also found no significant effect (p = ..965, ß = .007). In 
other words, it appears that a perceived information warfare attack had no effect on a 
military commander's trusting behavior in a C2 environment. There are two possible 
explanations for this finding. Moray and Lee (1996) suggest that a person's confidence 
in their own ability to manually control automation may be a factor for predicting trusting 
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behavior. Therefore, it is possible that subjects who were self-confident with their ability 
to detect erroneous track information during the training scenario may have been 
demonstrated more trusting behaviors. Unfortunately, self-confidence and computer 
proficiency were not measured in this experiment. 
Another possible explanation for this opposite finding may be due to the effects of 
game theory (Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, 1944). Game theorists suggest, similar 
to the rational decision making model that people will use the available information to 
adjust their strategy in order to maximize utility (Simon, 1957; Hall, 1996). Since the 
measure of trusting behavior in the second experiment was assigned confidence levels, 
and since those confidence levels were tied to the scoring system, it is possible that some 
subjects disregarded instructions to treat the simulation like a real-world situation and 
instead assigned confidence levels in such a way as to maximize their score. A similar 
scoring system was also used in the first experiment, except there was a penalty given if 
subjects contacted AW ACS for confirmation. 
Research Finding Overview 
As predicted, there is evidence to suggest that a military commander's disposition 
to trust computers in general is positively correlated with their situational decision to trust 
computers. Despite this correlation, only situational decision to trust seems to have been 
a good predictor of trusting behavior in a C2 environment. Therefore, if a C2 unit wants 
to decrease the time for its military commanders to make decisions, they should develop 
a method to foster the commander's trust in the C2 information system. However, if the 
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unit wants to increase skepticism in the systems that deliver information, they should 
develop a method to break-down the commander's trust in these systems. 
There also appears to be some evidence to suggest that trust an external safeguard 
may be a good predictor of trusting behavior in a C2 environment. However, this study 
found that external safeguards had a negative effect on trusting behavior. As discussed 
earlier, this may be a result of the military commander's unfulfilled expectations of the 
safeguard. This finding suggests that C2 units who want to lessen this negative effect 
may want develop a method that creates doubt about the effectiveness of safeguards. 
Research Limitations 
The subject populations for both experiments were active duty Air Force 
personnel. The population of the first experiment was actually a subgroup to this 
population, Air Battle Managers. Air Battle Managers are familiar with real-world 
command and control situations, since that is the focus of their primary mission. 
However, the affects from the first experiment may have proved stronger if the scenario 
were run using an AW ACS simulator. Since no AW ACS simulator was available for this 
experiment, another command and control simulator was used that had similar icons and 
functions as an AW ACS simulator.   Despite this, there were sufficient differences in the 
look-and-feel of this simulator compared to what they use on a day-to-day basis. These 
differences resulted in a steeper learning curve than anticipated. Additionally, only two 
hours was allotted for each subject trial and this may not have been enough for all 
subjects to overcome the learning curve. 
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The second experiment used Air Force officers from a variety of career fields, 
most of which did not directly support command and control operations. This, along with 
the unfamiliarity of the command and control simulator as mentioned earlier, may have 
resulted in a steeper learning curve than was found in the first experiment. While the 
second experiment was modified to account for this learning curve by simplifying the 
tasks, the same limitation on trial times was encountered. Therefore, it is likely that some 
of the subjects from the second experiment may also not have had enough time to 
overcome the learning curve. Finally, a limitation found in both experiments may have 
been the sterile and unrealistic laboratory setting. While every effort was made to get the 
subjects to adopt the role of a command and control commander, the laboratory setting 
may have detracted from this objective and resulted in less effective manipulations. 
Implications 
The results of this research contain important implications for Air Force 
command and control operations, particularly given the increasing threat of information 
warfare attacks. One important area in which this research may be useful is training. The 
findings that a person's pre-disposition to trust computers, both in general situations and 
specific situations, may prove useful in developing a training program to teach people to 
be more skeptical of information systems and improve error detection rates. For 
example, it may prove useful to develop a training method that reduces a person's trust 
both in computer in general and in C2 environments. By doing so, it may cause decision- 
makers to be more conservative and verify information prior to making a decision. 
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However according to the OODA Loop theory, in doing so it may also increase the 
decision-making duration and therefore prove to be more of a liability. 
Another area where this research may provide useful is in developing information 
warfare tactics. For instance, a psychological warfare tactic could be designed to 
manipulate the enemy's trust in their information system safeguards. While the findings 
of this research showed limited evidence that external safeguards affect trusting behavior, 
there was some evidence to suggest that lowering a decision-makers trust in an external 
safeguard would decrease trust and may, therefore, increase their decision-making time. 
Finally, the findings from this research may prove useful for helping to determine 
a more effective organizational structure in command and control units like the 
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). The CAOC functions with a similar collect 
mind concept as observed by Weick and Roberts (1993). This implies that each person in 
the CAOC has an aggregate mental picture of the effectiveness of computer security 
measures.    Therefore, understanding how trust in an external safeguard may prove 
useful in determining how to organize and operate this type of command and control unit. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings from this study are encouraging enough to continue this stream of 
research. While some evidence was found in this study to suggest that an individual's 
dispositional trust and situational decision to trust explains some of the variance in 
predicting trusting behavior, it is not clear if these affects hold true in a team 
environment. Both experiments employed in this research studied individual behaviors, 
however in real-world command and control environments it is more likely that 
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individuals are only a part of a command and control team. For instance, an AW ACS 
crew consists of several individuals each serving in a specialized function but interacting 
with other members of the team. Therefore, it would prove beneficial to the Air Force to 
understand how an individual's trust in computer systems is affected in a team-based 
environment. For instance, one interesting research question would be to see if a 
spoofing event detected by one member of the team spread to other team members. 
Another possible are of research would be to examine some of the other 
constructs of trust offered in McKnight and Chervany's (1999) model of trust. For 
instance, trusting belief is defined as the trust a person has in a specific person or object. 
It would be useful to understand how much of a person's trust in computer systems is 
explained by their trusting belief in a specific computer system. 
Finally, as observed in Muir's (1994) and other's research it would interesting to 
see trust degrades following an intentional computer malfunction in the same way it 
degrades following an unintentional malfunction. Additionally, it would be beneficial for 
the Air Force to examine if trust degrades more and over a longer period in following an 
intentional malfunction versus an unintentional malfunction. 
Summary 
There appears to be strong evidence that attitudes like situational decision to trust 
effects the trusting behavior of military commander's in C2 environments. Perhaps the 
most surprising and disturbing result was the failure to prove that information warfare has 
any effect on persons trusting behavior. These results have important implications for the 
United States Air Force, especially in the areas of defensive and offensive information 
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warfare. The findings from this study suggest the need for future research, both in 
individual behavior and in group behavior.   Perhaps one of the most important questions 
for future research should be to determine if the cost of making people less trustful, and 
therefore more prone to detecting errors in information systems is worth the speed and 
accessibility advantage offered by these systems. This accuracy versus speed trade off is 
suggested in Boyd's (1987) OODA Loop theory. 
This research indicates that trust in external safeguards may actually have an 
opposite effect than the one theorized by McKnight and Chervany (1999).   Additionally, 
the findings from these experiments suggest that in a C2 environment, especially a fast- 
paced, combat environment, the perception of information warfare attacks may not have a 
significant effect on decision-making behavior. Finally, the results of these experiments 
offer support for at least one facet of trust offered by McKnight and Chervany (1999), 
Situational decision to trust. As the Air Force, and in-fact most of society, continues to 
relay on information systems, future studies are needed to help understand how each of 
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Appendix 2: IW Threat Message 
— 1 Read Message                                          | 
^Ililtfc 
From: AV/ACS      Time: 00:10 
To:       UCAV4 
Subject: 
Network Attack Has Occurred 
Rating: 
^ n  ,,• :   v :  ■,■ z 
Message: 
Warning!!! An attack attempt 
against the local area network 
by hostile forces has occurred. 
Network Security Forces believe 
they have neutralized the threat. 
■^ 
^lllliiiP 
LJ                                ._  f-I 
Rate Message: 







I Close !                                            Delete 
llli 
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Appendix 3: Scenario Brief 
TIME: June 25, 2005 
LOCATION: 766th UCAV Ops Squadron, Operating Location Alpha 
BACKGROUND: 
You are an operations crewmember of the newly formed 766  Unmanned Combat Aerial 
Vehicle (UCAV) Operations Squadron (766 UOS) deployed in Southwest Asia. The 766 
UOS consists of a squadron headquarters located in Dahrain, Saudi Arabia, and five remote 
operating locations dispersed along the Saudi Arabian border with Iraq. Each operating 
location consists of an operations cab, communications cab, remote landing field, inflatable 
hangar, and various tents for sleeping, eating, and other living requirements. Each operating 
location is responsible for maintaining and controlling 20 of the new UCAVs, commonly 
referred to as the Viper. Due to the advanced technology and ease-of-use of the UCAV 
operations system, a single crewmember is capable of controlling up to 3 Vipers and a Tanker 
aircraft. 
THE PRESENT 
You have just relieved the night shift after attending the crew changeover briefing where 
you received the standing mission briefing, Intelligence briefing, and the Rules of 
Engagement briefing. The following is a summary of the information you received: 
MISSION:   Defend the airspace around the northern Saudi Arabian city of Jhadamir against 
any and all unauthorized aircraft. Operating Location Alpha is one of four UCAV operation 
cabs dispersed around this defended airspace. You are responsible, for air surveillance, track 
identification, and weapon interdiction for one the upper left quadrant 
96 
Appendix 3: Scenario Brief (continued) 
INTEL BRIEF: The Iraqis have acquired new computer technology from the Peoples 
Republic of China's Information Warfare Force (IWF). This technology is thought to include 
some of the most advanced network attack and information manipulation systems in the 
world. Sources report Chinese advisors from the IWF have been seen in and around the 
Iraqi-Saudi Arabian border. The Chinese have recently been successful in demonstrating an 
Information Warfare tactic known as Strategic Information Manipulation (SIM) against the 
Taiwanese government. SIM is a technique whereby a computer system is covertly accessed 
and real-time tactical information is manipulated in order to confuse or spoof the recipient. 
Intel also reports that satellite imagery has confirmed the Iraqi military's recovery of several 
air-launched missiles armed with chemical warheads from hidden desert bunkers. These 
missiles have been distributed to Iraqi air bases just north of the Iraqi No-Fly zone. In early 
May, Iraqi officials stated on Iraqi national television that the Iraqi government demands the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all forces in and around the Iraqi No-fly zone. In 
addition, they stated that if these forces were not withdrawn by the June first then the Iraqi 
military will use weapons of mass destruction on those forces and the countries that host 
them. Intel sources and satellite imagery indicate an massive Iraqi air assault is imminent. 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: By the order of the President of the United States, all US 
military forces are authorized to fire upon any suspected hostile aircraft. Unknown air tracks 
should be considered hostile. 
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Appendix 4: Simulation Scoring System 
• Destroy Hostile track = +10 points to Offense Score 
• Request Info from AW ACS = -5 to Offense Score 
• Hostile enters Outer No-fly Zone = -1 points per second to Defense 
Score 
• Hostile enters Inner No-fly Zone = -3 points per second to Defense 
Score 
• Destroy Friendly track = -100 points to Defense Score 
• UCAV Destroyed = -25 points to Offense Score 
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Appendix 5: Multiple Choice Test 
Training Evaluation 
Please circle the correct answer: 
1.    For purposes of this evaluation, the UCAV C2 system processes and displays information 
reliably of the time. 
a. 100% 
b. 75 % 
c. 50 % 
d. 25 % 
The role of the Network Security Force is to. 
a. Monitor the network only 
b. Protect the network only 
c. Monitor and Protect the network 
d. None of the above 




d. None of the above 
4. The information warfare tactic that covertly manipulates data to spoof the operator is called 
a. Denial of Service 
b. Information Manipulation 
c. Hacking 
d. None of the above 
5.    The main components of the UCAV C2 system are. 
a. The computer system, the ground station, and the UCAVs 
b. The computer system, the Network Security Forces, and the AW ACS 
c. The Network Security Forces, the computer system, the ground station, and UCAVs 
d. None of the above 
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Appendix 5: Multiple Choice Test (continued) 
6. A secondary means by which you can verify the track identity is to  
a. Send a request to the UCAV pilot 
b. Send a request track info message to the AW ACS 
c. Send a free text e-mail message to the Network Security Forces 
d. None of the above 
7. The UCAVs will  
a. Automatically determine the identity of the track once in sensor range 
b. Detect ground, sea, and air tracks 
c. Only detect the presence of a track and classify it as Unknown 
d. None of the above 
8. The outer blue sensor ring represents  
a. The weapons range 
b. The UCAVs range 
c. The vulnerability range 
d. The sensor range 
The inner yellow sensor ring represents. 
a. The weapons range 
b. The UCAVs range 
c. The vulnerability range 
d. The sensor range 
10. The middle red sensor ring represents. 
a. The weapons range 
b. The UCAVs range 
c. The vulnerability range 
d. The sensor range 
11. The Network Security Force (NSF) is 
network. 
e. 100% 
f. 90 % 
g. 60 % 
h.    25 % 
. effective in protecting and monitoring the 
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Appendix 7: Randomized Block Design 









12 Jun 00 0800 High Present 1 1 
High Not Present 2 2 
High Present 3 3 
High Not Present 4 4 
1030 Low Not Present 1 5 
Low Present 2 6 
Low Not Present 3 7 
Low Present 4 8 
1400 High Present 1 9 
High Not Present 2 10 
High Present 3 11 
High Not Present 4 12 
13 Jun 00 0800 Low Not Present 1 13 
Low Present 2 14 
Low Not Present 3 15 
Low Present 4 16 
1030 High Present 1 17 
High Not Present 2 18 
High Present 3 19 
High Not Present 4 20 
1400 Low Not Present 1 21 
Low Present 2 22 
Low Not Present 3 23 
Low Present 4 24 
14 Jun 00 0800 High Not Present 1 25 
High Present 2 26 
High Not Present 3 27 
High Present 4 28 
1030 Low Present 1 29 
Low Not Present 2 30 
Low Present 3 31 
Low Not Present 4 32 
1400 High Not Present 1 33 
High Present 2 34 
High Not Present 3 35 
High Present 4 36 
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Appendix 7: Randomized Block Design (continued) 









15 Jun 00 0800 Low Present 1 37 
Low Not Present 2 38 
Low Present 3 39 
Low Not Present 4 40 
1030 High Not Present 1 41 
High Present 2 42 
High Not Present 3 43 
High Present 4 44 
1400 Low Present 1 45 
Low Not Present 2 46 
Low Present 3 47 
Low Not Present 4 48 
16 Jun 00 0800 High Present 1 49 
High Not Present 2 50 
High Present 3 51 
High Not Present 4 52 
1030 Low Not Present 1 53 
Low Present 2 54 
Low Not Present 3 55 
Low Present 4 56 
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Appendix 8: Subject Consent Form 
Informed Consent Form 
Study Overview 
Welcome to the experiment. The following is a general description of the study 
and a reminder of your rights as a potential subject. As in any study, your participation 
is completely voluntary. If now, or at any point during the study, you decide that you 
do not want to continue participating, please let the experimenter know and you will be 
dismissed without penalty. Also, please remember that your name will not be 
associated with any of the information that you provide during the study. All of the 
information you provide is absolutely anonymous and confidential. 
In this study, you will be working as part of a group to complete two group tasks. 
You will also be asked to complete two questionnaires during the study. You will first 
be given a questionnaire to complete, then you will complete the first task as a group, 
after a short break you will be given the second task to complete as a group, and 
finally, you will be given a second questionnaire to complete. The experimenter will 
give you more specific instructions later in the study. If you have any questions or 
concerns at this time, please inform the experimenter. 
For further information 
The Air Force Institute of Technology faculty members responsible for conducting this research are Maj. Michael 
Morris and Maj. Paul Thurston. They would be happy to address any of your questions or concerns regarding this study. Maj. 
Morris can be reached at 255-3636 ext 4578 and Maj. Thurston can be reached at 255-6565 ext 4315. 
If you would like to participate in this study, please sign in the space provided. 
Your signature indicates that you are aware of each of the following: 1) the general 
procedure to be used in this study, 2) your right to discontinue participation at any 






Appendix 9: Biometrie Data Form 
Subject Biographical Profile 
Subject ID #  Group:       Date:. 
Age:  Male     Female 
WD experience (approximate): Years:  Months:  
Occupation:   WD   AWO   SD 
Flight Status: Mission Ready or DNIF    Current Medications:  
Total E-3 Flight Hours:  Other: (AC type # hrs)  
Indicate the number of times you participated in the following exercises: 
 Red Flag 
 Green Flag 
 Maple Flag 
 Tactical Fighter Wing ORI 
 NORAD Exercise 
 Coronet Sentry 
 Warrior Flag 
Other:  
Approximate flight hours as CAP. 
Approximate flight hours as STK. 
Approximate flight hours as HVAA. 
Total Number SIM hours (est):  Total number EVALS:  Last EVAL: _ 
Qualifications Levels: CMR/E    CMR/I   BMC   Instructor 
Please indicate how many of the following you have completed in the last 4 months: 
ATD (SIM) Flight 
 Mission scenarios   Weapons Sorties 
 LFE missions  2 v X 
 Close control intercept missions  4 v X 
 2vX 
 4vX 




Appendix 10: Training Presentation 
System Description 
UCAV G2 System 
Computer/Display 
ms ± Stxüon -»-»ä UCAV l *&&'■ 
^>€*UCAVn 
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Appendix 10: Training Presentation (continued) 
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Appendix 10: Training Presentation (continued) 
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Appendix 10: Training Presentation (continued) 
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Appendix 10: Training Presentation (continued) 






Individual   Team 
Offense +200       +200 
Defense+I0ÖO0;i;(;r " V-: +10000 
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Appendix 10: Training Presentation (continued) 
Score System 
Score System: 
• Destroy Hostile track = +10 points to Offense Score 
• Request Info from AWACS = -5 to Offense Score 
•Hostile enters Outer No-fly Zone = -1 points per second to Defense Score 
•Hostile enters Inner No-fly Zone = -3 points per second to Defense Score 
• Destroy Friendly track = -100 points to Defense Score 
• UCAV Destroyed - -25 points to Offense Score 
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Appendix 11: Pre-Test Survey 
Participant Questionnaire 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best matches your beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;    2 = Disagree; 3 = No Opinion;   4 = Agree;    5 = Strongly Agree 
1.     If you initiate a task for the average computer system to perform, the computer 
system will finish it successfully. 
2.     My typical approach is to trust new computer systems until they prove I shouldn't 
trust them. 
3.     I feel assured that the Network Security Forces adequately protects me from attacks 
to the local area network. 
4.      Most computer systems are adequate to perform operational-type functions. 
5.    The local area network has enough safeguards to make me feel comfortable using 
information that is received through it to perform real-world missions. 
6.      I can always rely on computer systems in an operational setting. 
7.     When I'm in an operational environment, I feel I can rely on the computer systems I 
work with in that setting. 
8.     I usually trust computer systems until they give me a reason not to trust them. 
9.     There are a good number of computer systems that do not perform as you would 
expect. 
10.  I feel confident that the Network Security Force monitoring and protection measures 
on the local area network make it safe for me to perform real-world missions. 
11.  In an operational setting, I can depend on computer systems I work with. 
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Appendix 11: Pre-Test Survey (continued) 
Participant Questionnaire 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best matches your 
beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;    2 = Disagree; 3 = No Opinion;   4 = Agree;    5 = Strongly 
Agree 
11.  In an operational setting, I can depend on computer systems I work with. 
12.  Most computer systems do a haphazard job at what they do. 
13.    I think I can adequately rely on the computer systems as a tool in an operational 
setting. 
14.  Many computer systems are not really adequate to process real-world operational 
data. 
15.  I feel I can depend on computer systems in an operational context. 
16.  I believe that most computer systems do a very good job in what they were 
programmed to do. 
17.  I generally give computer systems the benefit of the doubt when I first use them. 
18.  In general, the local area network is a robust and safe environment in which 
perform real-world operational missions. 
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Appendix 12: Post-Test Survey 
Participant Questionnaire 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best matches your beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;    2 = Disagree; 3 = No Opinion;   4 = Agree;    5 = Strongly Agree 
18.  If you initiate a task for the average computer system to perform, the computer 
system will finish it successfully. 
19.  My typical approach is to trust new computer systems until they prove I shouldn't 
trust them. 
20.  I feel assured that the Network Security Forces adequately protects me from attacks 
to the local area network. 
21.    Most computer systems are adequate to perform operational-type functions. 
22. The local area network has enough safeguards to make me feel comfortable using 
information that is received through it to perform real-world missions. 
23.    I can always rely on computer systems in an operational setting. 
24.  When I'm in an operational environment, I feel I can rely on the computer systems I 
work with in that setting. 
25.  I usually trust computer systems until they give me a reason not to trust them. 
26.  There are a good number of computer systems that do not perform as you would 
expect. 
27.  I feel confident that the Network Security Force monitoring and protection measures 
on the local area network make it safe for me to perform real-world missions. 
28.  In an operational setting, I can depend on computer systems I work with. 
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Appendix 12: Post-Test Survey (Continued) 
Participant Questionnaire 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best matches your 
beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;    2 = Disagree; 3 = No Opinion;   4 = Agree;    5 = Strongly 
Agree 
11.  In an operational setting, I can depend on computer systems I work with. 
12.  Most computer systems do a haphazard job at what they do. 
13.    I think I can adequately rely on the computer systems as a tool in an operational 
setting. 
14.  Many computer systems are not really adequate to process real-world operational 
data. 
15.  I feel I can depend on computer systems in an operational context. 
16.  I believe that most computer systems do a very good job in what they were 
programmed to do. 
17.  I generally give computer systems the benefit of the doubt when I first use them. 
18.  In general, the local area network is a robust and safe environment in which 
perform real-world operational missions. 
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Appendix 12: Post-Test Survey (Continued) 
Please answer the following questions: 
1 - Not at all; 2 - barely; 3 - No Opinion; 4-Somewhat; 5-Very 
1.  In your own opinion, how effective do you feel a system like the 
UCAV will be for air-to-air missions? 
2. In your own opinion, how effective do you feel a unit like the Network 
Security Force is in monitoring and protecting a local area network against 
information warfare threats? 
3.  In your own opinion, how vulnerable to you feel the Air Force is 
against information warfare threats? 
Please feel free to add any of your own comments: 
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Appendix 13: Air Space Boundary 
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Appendix 15: Scenario Brief 
BACKGROUND: 
You are the air defense commander for 766th Air Defense Unit deployed in Northwest Taiwan. The 
766th is a joint air defense unit that integrates tactical ground radar units and surface-to-air missile defense 
units into a single weapon system. The ADU is a deployed arm of the Air Operation Center and has data 
connectivity with the AOC, remote radar sites, and remote SAM sites. 
*W^^'»_' * .H« islands .oi 







:30: SO fti Lt!%m:     Strati. 
THE PRESENT: You have just received the crew changeover briefing where you received the 
standard mission briefing, Intelligence briefing, and the Rules of Engagement briefing. The following 
is a summary of the information you received: 
MISSION:   Defend the assigned air space against any suspected hostile aircraft. The 766th is one of 
several air defense units dispersed along the coast of Taiwan. You are responsible for air surveillance, 
track identification, and weapon interdiction. The commander of the 766   is also responsible for 
assigning a confidence level to all track information and forwarding that information to the Air 
Operation Center. 
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Appendix 15: Scenario Brief (continued) 
INTEL BRIEF: 
In early July, the Chinese government declared it does not recognize the independence of Taiwan, 
as declared by the Taiwanese government this past June. 
In response to this declaration, Taiwan requested and received military support from the United 
States. This support consisted of two naval battle groups, the regional deployment of 120 fighter and 
support aircraft, and the local deployment of 5 new Air Defense Units with remotely operated radar 
and SAM sites. 
The deployment was completed in late August. Following this deployment, China threaten that if 
allied forces were not withdrawn by the first of September then China would reserve the option for a 
military response. Intel sources and satellite imagery indicate a massive Chinese air assault is 
imminent. 
Intel also reports that the Peoples Republic of China's Information Warfare Force (IWF) have been 
probing the U.S. forces Wide Area Network. The IWF technology is thought to include some of the 
most advanced network attack and information manipulation systems in the world. The Chinese have 
recently demonstrated a successful Information Warfare attack, known as Strategic Information 
Manipulation (SIM), against the Taiwanese government. SIM is a technique whereby the network is 
covertly accessed and real-time tactical or strategic information is manipulated in order to confuse or 
spoof the enemy 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: By the order of the President of the United States, all US military 
forces are authorized to use deadly force to interdict hostile aircraft from entering Taiwanese airspace. 
121 
Appendix 16: Simulation Scoring System 
Confidence Level 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Shoot 
Enemy 




N/A -40 -90 -160 -250 
-500 
If an enemy enters the protected air space, you will lose 1 point 
for each second it remains in the air space. 
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Appendix 17: Randomized Block Design 









12 Jun 00 0800 High Present 1 1 
High Not Present 2 2 
High Present 3 3 
High Not Present 4 4 
1030 Low Not Present 1 5 
Low Present 2 6 
Low Not Present 3 7 
Low Present 4 8 
1400 High Present 1 9 
High Not Present 2 10 
High Present 3 11 
High Not Present 4 12 
13 JunOO 0800 Low Not Present 1 13 
Low Present 2 14 
Low Not Present 3 15 
Low Present 4 16 
1030 High Present 1 17 
High Not Present 2 18 
High Present 3 19 
High Not Present 4 20 
1400 Low Not Present 1 21 
Low Present 2 22 
Low Not Present 3 23 
Low Present 4 24 
14 Jun 00 0800 High Not Present 1 25 
High Present 2 26 
High- Not Present 3 27 
High Present 4 28 
1030 Low Present 1 29 
Low Not Present 2 30 
Low Present 3 31 
Low Not Present 4 32 
1400 High Not Present 1 33 
High Present 2 34 
High Not Present 3 35 
High Present 4 36 
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Appendix 17: Randomized Block Design (continued) 









15 Jun 00 0800 Low Present 1 37 
Low Not Present 2 38 
Low Present 3 39 
Low Not Present 4 40 
1030 High Not Present 1 41 
High Present 2 42 
High Not Present 3 43 
High Present 4 44 
1400 Low Present 1 45 
Low Not Present 2 46 
Low Present 3 47 
Low Not Present 4 48 
16 Jun 00 0800 High Present 1 49 
High Not Present 2 50 
High Present 3 51 
High Not Present 4 52 
1030 Low Not Present 1 53 
Low Present 2 54 
Low Not Present 3 55 
Low Present 4 56 
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Appendix 18: Subject Consent Form 
Informed Consent Form 
Study Overview 
Welcome to the experiment. The following is a general description of the study and a reminder of 
your rights as a potential subject. As in any study, your participation is completely voluntary. If now, 
or at any point during the study, you decide that you do not want to continue participating, please let the 
experimenter know and you will be dismissed without penalty. Also, please remember that your name 
will not be associated with any of the information that you provide during the study. All of the 
information you provide is absolutely anonymous and confidential. 
In this study, you will be working as part of a group to complete a mission objective. You will also 
be asked to complete two questionnaires during the study. You will first be given a questionnaire to 
complete, then following the training, you will be given the second questionnaire to complete. The 
experimenter will give you more specific instructions later in the study. If you have any questions or 
concerns at this time, please inform the experimenter. 
For further information 
The Air Force Institute of Technology faculty members responsible for conducting this 
research are Maj. David Biros. He would be happy to address any of your questions or concerns 
regarding this study. Maj. Biros can be reached at 255-3636 ext 4578. 
If you would like to participate in this study, please sign in the space provided. Your signature 
indicates that you are aware of each of the following: 1) the general procedure to be used in this study, 
2) your right to discontinue participation at any time, and 3) you and your name will not be associated 
with any of the information you provide. 
Printed Name: 
Signature:  Date: 
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Appendix 19: Biometrie Data Form 
Participant Information Sheet Participant #. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is a short two-part survey to determine the demographic information of the participants 
in this research as well as their experience level with computer systems. The data collected will be 
used to aid in the evaluation of the results of the simulation. All information provided will be kept 
confidential and will not be able to be traced back to the participant. 
SECTION 1 - Demographic Information 
1. Age  
2. Rank  
3. AFSC 
4. Number of years served in current AFSC. 
5. Total number of years served in the military 
SECTION II - Computer Experience 
1. Are you currently, or have you ever, worked in a computer communications position? 
2. Do you consider yourself to be knowledgeable about computers? 
3. Are you familiar with how a computer network operates? 
4. Are you fluent in any programming languages? 
5. Which programs do you use on a frequent basis (circle all that apply) 
E-mail MS Powerpoint 
MS Word UNIX 
MS Excel 
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Appendix 20: Survey One (Dispositional Trust) 
Survey 1 Participant #:  
INSTRUCTIONS 
The information you provide will be kept confidential. In addition, your identity will not be linked to 
this data. The information collected from this form will be used to help evaluate the ADV system 
and training program. 
Participant Questionnaire 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best 
matches your beliefs. 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that 
best matches your beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;     2 = Disagree;   3 = Somewhat Disagree;    4 = No opinion 
5 = Somewhat Agree;      6 = Agree;       7 = Strongly Agree 
1.     If you initiate a task for the average computer system to perform, the computer 
system will finish it correctly. 
2. I believe that most computer systems are consistent. 
3. Most computer systems are reliable. 
4. I believe that most computer systems are technically competent. 
5. I feel I can depend on most computer systems. 
6. I can trust most computer systems. 
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Appendix 21: Survey Two (Situational Decision to Trust) 
Survey 2 Participant #:  
INSTRUCTIONS 
The information you provide will be kept confidential. In addition, your identity will not be linked to 
this data. The information collected from this form will be used to help evaluate the ADU system 
and training program. 
Definition: Command and Control (C2) 
Command and control (C2) describes the basic job of the military battle commander. The battle 
commander is responsible for directing military forces to accomplish military objectives against an 
adversary.    In your case, this is air space defense using surface-to-air missiles. C2 objectives often 
result in material damage and/or human casualties to both the adversary and friendly forces. 
Participant Questionnaire 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best 
matches your beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;    2 = Disagree; 3 = Somewhat Disagree;   4 = No Opinion;    5 = 
Somewhat Agree; 6 = Agree;    7 =Strongly Agree 
1. In a command and control environment like described in the scenario brief, I believe 
computers can be relied upon to help commanders make operational decisions. 
2.        I feel I can depend on computer systems to provide timely and accurate 
information to battle commanders in a combat situation. 
3.        In a command and control setting like the one described in the scenario, I feel that 
I can adequately trust information received from most computer systems. 
4.        I believe that most computer systems used in deployable battle cabs are secure 
enough to trust in combat situations. 
5.        I feel most computer systems used in command and control units are dependable. 
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Appendix 22: Training Presentation 
Air Defense Unit (ADU) 
Dynamic Distributed Decision-Support 
(DDD) System 
Field Evaluation 







ADU Battle Cab 




Appendix 22: Training Presentation (Continued) 
Other Network Participants 
Monitors and protects 
«vm^'ma^wmmm»*, Local;Area Networks 
ADU Battle Cab 
ADU Commander Tasks 
Monitor Air Space 
Determine Identity of Air Tracks 
- DDD Graphical Display 
- Raw Messages from Sensor Sites 
Assign a Confidence Level to the Track 
Either allow access to protected air space or 
attack using a Surface to Air Missile 
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Appendix 22: Training Presentation (Continued) 
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Appendix 22; Training Presentation (Continued) 
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Appendix 22: Training Presentation (Continued) 
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Appendix 22: Training Presentation (Continued) 
Score System 
Confidence Level 
0 l 2 3 4 5 
Shoot 
Enemy 
N/A 20 40 70 110 160 
Shoot 
Friendly N/A. -40 -90 -160 -250 -500 
If an enemy enters the protected air space, 
you will löse 1 point for each second it 
remains in the air space. 
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Appendix 23: Survey Three (Trusting Belief) 
Survey 3 Participant #:_ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The information you provide will be kept confidential. In addition, your identity will not be linked 
to this data. The information collected from this form will be used to help evaluate the ADU 
computer system and training program. 
Please answer all of the questions below. Use the scale provided and enter the number that best 
matches your beliefs. 
1 = Strongly Disagree;    2 = Disagree; 3 = Somewhat Disagree;   4 = No Opinion;    5 = 
Somewhat Agree; 6 = Agree;    7 =Strongly Agree 
1.  The DDD computer system is predictable. 
2.  The DDD computer system is consistent. 
3.  The DDD computer system is technically competent. 
4.  The DDD computer system has integrity. 
5.  The DDD computer system is reliable. 
6.  The DDD computer system is dependable 
7.  I can trust the DDD computer system. 
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Appendix 24: Fratricide Warning 
WJCTffll 
g    WARNING WARNING WARNING 
*     ROC indicates Track AHG-215 at (360.0.337.6) was a FRIENDLY!! 
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